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The replacement of custodial with non-custodial sanctions holds the potential to reduce recidivism as 
well as other costs associated with imprisonment. However, the causal impacts on recidivism of non-
custodial sanctions in general, and electronic monitoring (EM) programs in particular, remain unclear. 
We estimate the effect of EM on recidivism by exploiting an EM program that was gradually 
introduced in Norwegian counties from 2008, using difference-in-differences and instrumental 
variable designs. Results show that introducing EM reduced 2-year recidivism rates by about 10 
percent, which corresponds to about 19 percent for those actually serving on EM. We find no effects 
on recidivism intensity or severity. Subsample analyses show that the effect estimates are strongest 
among offenders without previous imprisonment or recent unemployment spells, and although 
between-groups differences are statistically non-significant, this suggest that avoiding prison stigma 
and maintaining workplace relations can be important to reduce recidivism and promote desistance. 
The reliability of our results is somewhat challenged by unstable pre-implementation trends and 
signs that more people are convicted to EM-qualifying sentences when EM is introduced. 
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Sammendrag 
I september 2008 introduserte Kriminalomsorgen straffegjennomføring med elektronisk kontroll (også 
kalt fotlenke) som et prøveprosjekt i seks fylker i Norge. Med et uttalt mål om å redusere soningskøen 
og bedre den enkeltes forutsetning for et kriminalitetsfritt liv, åpnet denne straffegjennomførings-
formen for at ubetingede fengselsstraffer på inntil 120 dager kunne sones utenfor fengsel1 – gitt at den 
domfelte søkte om dette og ble godkjent i en egnethetsvurdering gjennomført av Kriminalomsorgen.  
 
Hvorvidt fotlenkeordningen har ønsket effekt på tilbakefall til ny kriminalitet er et viktig 
kriminalpolitisk spørsmål. Når vi sammenligner de som får anledning til å sone straffen på fotlenke 
med de som soner straffen i fengsel, finner vi at de på fotlenke har 47 prosent lavere tilbakefallsrate 
(målt etter to år) og at de i tillegg begår færre og mindre alvorlige lovbrudd (jf. Rasmussen mfl., 2016; 
Rokkan, 2012b). En slik direkte sammenligning tar imidlertid ikke hensyn til seleksjonsprosessen som 
sørger for at kun bestemte lovbrytergrupper (med lav tilbakefallsrisiko) tilbys å sone med fotlenke. 
Dette gjør det vanskelig å vite hvorvidt de som soner med fotlenke har lavere tilbakefall fordi de soner 
straffen sin på denne måten, eller om de ville hatt det uansett. Denne distinksjonen mellom korrelasjon 
og kausalitet er viktig når man ønsker å si noe om effektene av ulike politiske ordninger og tiltak.  
 
I denne analysen søker vi derfor å ta hensyn til slike metodiske utfordringer ved å benytte et kvasi-
eksperimentelt design. Vi utnytter at den gradvise implementeringen av fotlenkeordningen mellom 
2008 og 2011 skaper variasjon i både eksponering og kapasitet over tid og sted, og estimerer effekten 
av fotlenke på tilbakefall i en forskjell-i-forskjeller og en instrumentvariabelanalyse. Resultatene viser 
at innføringen av fotlenkeordningen ikke førte til noen endringer i tilbakefallsintensiteten og -
alvorlighetsgraden, men at tilbakefallsraten målt etter to år falt med 2.38 prosentpoeng. Dette tilsvarer 
en nedgang på ca. 10 prosent i pilotfylkene, noe som igjen innebærer omlag 19 prosent blant de som 
faktisk soner på fotlenke. Det finnes mange ulike mekanismer som kan forklare denne nedgangen, 
men analysen vår er ikke egnet til å utforske disse videre.  
 
Det finnes to viktige forbehold ved denne analysen, som innebærer at resultatene må tolkes med en 
viss grad av forsiktighet. For det første er tilbakefallstrendene noe usystematiske i både pilotfylkene 
og sammenligningsfylkene, og for det andre finner vi tegn til at dommere i pilotfylkene har endret 
atferden sin etter fotlenkeinnføringen. Dette gjør det vanskelig å utelukke at resultatene påvirkes av 
andre strafferettslige forhold enn fotlenkeordningen i seg selv. 
                                                     
1 Ordningen åpnet også for å avslutte lengre fengselsstraffer med fotlenke (såkalt delgjennomføring), men her fokuserer vi 
kun på helgjennomføring.  
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1 Introduction 
The desire and need to reduce prison populations and correctional costs has led questions of non-
custodial alternatives to “traditional” imprisonment to the forefront of criminal justice debates (see e.g. 
Tonry, 1998; Van Kalmthout, 2012; Villettaz, Gilliéron and Killias, 2015). In addition to limiting the 
direct fiscal costs of large prison systems, an increased adoption of non-custodial sanctions holds the 
potential to reduce the substantial collateral consequences of incarceration that impact offenders, 
families and communities alike. Incarceration has repeatedly been shown to be detrimentally 
associated with e.g. union stability, employment relations, income, health, and children’s development 
(cf. Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999; Lopoo and Western, 2005; Massoglia, Remster and King, 2011; 
Schnittker and John, 2007; Wakefield and Wildeman, 2013; Western, 2006; Western, Kling and 
Weiman, 2001) – suggesting that the punishment of imprisonment does not end at release.2 
Opportunity structures as well as formal and informal social ties are key aspects of criminological 
theories addressing reentry and desistance (Agnew, 1992; 2001; Laub and Sampson, 2001; Sampson 
and Laub, 1993), and one might therefore argue that non-custodial alternatives to prison can improve 
the convict’s prospects of a crime-free life.3  
 
In spite of a long tradition for implementing and evaluating non-custodial sanctions, as well as strong 
theoretical foundations for and a widespread academic belief in the superiority of non-custodial 
sanctions in promoting convicts’ desistance from crime, the empirical evidence of such a causal 
relationship is still inconclusive. The main problem, of course, is that convicts serving non-custodial 
sanctions do so for a reason – typically that they are convicted for a less severe crime or that they are 
regarded more likely to desist from crime in the future. Because it is difficult to fully account for such 
selection on unobservables in empirical studies, estimates of the beneficial causal effect of non-
custodial sanctions will tend to be upward biased. In line with this, Villettaz et al. (2015) conclude that 
recidivism is lower for non-custodial sanctions in most comparisons, although this conclusion is less 
clear in methodologically more reliable studies (e.g. controlled and natural experiments) than in quasi-
experiments. They highlight that small sample sizes along with insufficient control of pre-intervention 
differences remains prominent challenges, and that more research is needed in order to draw general 
causal conclusions. 
 
                                                     
2 Note that the negative relationship between imprisonment and various outcomes can be a result of selection as well as by 
causality; see e.g. Bhuller et al. (2016). 
3 Though it may reduce the convict’s likelihood of recidivism (i.e. specific deterrence), non-custodial sanctions may reduce 
general deterrence. 
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One important source of information on the effectiveness of non-custodial sentences can be found in 
the introduction and expansion of so-called electronic monitoring4 (EM) programs over the last couple 
of decades. Currently a part of the penal system in most western countries (Renzema and Mayo-
Wilson, 2005), EM has been used to replace custodial as well as non-custodial sanctions (such as 
community service) and in some cases also to widen the “correctional net” by being implemented as a 
new sentencing option (cf. Bales et al., 2010; Black and Smith, 2003; Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 
2005). Usually based on either global positioning system (GPS) or radio frequency (RF) technology, 
EM programs that replace traditional incarceration typically monitor the offender’s whereabouts while 
he or she serves the sentence at home and participates (to various degrees) in rehabilitative/integrating 
programs and activities. Although intuitively and theoretically promising, the empirical EM literature 
suffers from many of the same shortcomings as the general literature on non-custodial sanctions (e.g. 
Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013; Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 2005; Whitfield, 2001).5 The causal 
effect of EM on recidivism (and other outcomes) therefore remains uncertain.  
 
With an aim of increasing our more general knowledge of the potential of non-custodial vs. custodial 
sanctions in reducing reoffending, this study focuses on EM as an alternative to incarceration and 
make use of a policy intervention that was implemented in six of Norway’s nineteen counties from 
September 2008. This introduced “front-door” EM as an alternative way of serving unconditional 
prison sentences of no more than 120 days6, and “back-door” EM as a way of ending longer 
unconditional prison sentences (Øster and Rokkan, 2015). Due to theoretical and pragmatic 
considerations it is only the front-door part of the program that is assessed in this paper.  
 
The admission to EM was decided by the Norwegian Correctional Services (NCS) and not the courts, 
and front-door EM does hence represented a true, low-cost alternative to prison. The Norwegian 
intervention was gradually expanded within some of the pilot counties in 2010, before four more 
counties were enrolled in 2011.7 Although EM was not randomized, the gradual nature of the 
implementation creates variation in EM exposure and capacity over both time and place – creating a 
quasi-experimental setting. We make use of this variation to estimate both difference-in-differences 
and instrumental variable models in order to elicit causal effects of EM on recidivism.  
 
                                                     
4 Also referred to as “electronic tagging” (e.g. Marklund and Holmberg, 2009; Taylor and Ariel, 2012). 
5 In the EM literature randomized studies are very rare, and the only exception seems to be Killias et al. (2010). 
6 120 days might seem very short in an international perspective; however, Norwegian prison sentences are relatively short. 
In 2014, 58 percent of everyone released from prison were released within 90 days or less, 87 percent within one year, and 
only 1 percent after 5 years or more (Norwegian Correction Service, 2014). 
7 Note that we refer to the counties that implemented EM as pilot, EM and treatment counties, and the counties that did not 
implement EM as non-pilot, non-EM and comparison counties. 
6 
We use population-wide data as provided by the NCS and Statistics Norway, and measure three 
different aspects of reoffending behavior for up to three years; the recidivism rate, the recidivism 
intensity and the recidivism severity. We also explore differences in the effect of EM in theoretically 
interesting subsamples. 
 
Our results show that the mere correlation between EM and reoffending behavior is clear: Offenders 
serving on EM have lower recidivism rates and reoffend with less intensity and severity than offenders 
serving in prison. This is what we would expect, as the EM program is targeted at a low-risk segment 
of the prison population. We also find, however, that offenders serving in EM counties had a larger 
drop in recidivism rates when EM became available than did offenders serving in non-EM counties. 
We find similar results when using the available number of RF bands to instrument for serving on EM, 
and our results thus suggest that EM did causally reduce recidivism rates. Moreover, our subsample 
analysis shows that the estimates are strongest for offenders without previous prison experience and 
without recent unemployment spells. Although associated with statistical uncertainty, this may be 
taken to suggest that EM reduces recidivism by exempting the individual of the stigma and other 
collateral consequences associated with incarceration, as well as by enabling him or her to maintain 
employment relations. This is useful policy insight not only to the Norwegian system, but also to other 
countries using EM or other non-custodial sanctions as part of their penal system. We undertake a 
number of specification and robustness checks, and in general our findings seem robust although some 
concerns remain related to unstable pre-implementation trends and signs that more people are 
convicted to EM-qualifying sentences when EM is introduced. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured in the following way. Section 2 briefly describes our 
theoretical expectations and previous research, and we outline several mechanisms that imply varying 
impacts of EM on recidivism across specific subsamples. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
Norwegian EM program, focusing on its implementation, contents and target population, and Section 
4 describes our empirical strategy. Data sources, data management and sampling procedures are 
described in Section 5, before we present our results and robustness checks in Section 6. Finally, 
Section 7 includes a discussion of theoretical and policy implications, as well as limitations and 
suggestions for future research. Supplementary material is provided in five appendices.  
2 Theoretical expectations and previous research 
The use of electronic monitoring became commonplace in the US in the late 1980’s and in Europe in 
the 1990’s. The current literature on EM is quite extensive (see e.g. Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013, 
Killias et al., 2010, Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 2005 for reviews), but the causal effects of EM on 
recidivism (and other outcomes) remain unclear. For instance, while Renzema and Mayo-Wilson’s 
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review from 2005 concludes that “applications of EM as a tool for reducing crime [among moderate to 
high-risk offenders] are not supported by existing data” (Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 2005, p. 215), 
more recent research using quasi-experimental designs have provided some support for reductions in 
recidivism when compared to custodial sentences (e.g. Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013; Jørgensen, 
2011; Marklund and Holmberg, 2009). Also, in a randomized trial conducted in Switzerland in 2000, 
Killias et al. (2010) found that those assigned to EM reoffend less and are more likely to become 
married than those assigned to community service (p<0.10), suggesting that EM strengthens family 
ties and/or weakens unfavorable peer influence (cf. Huckelsby, 2008; Martin, Hanrahan and Bowers, 
2009).  
 
Although recent research seems to be suggestive of a beneficial effect of EM on recidivism, it is 
important to note that most studies come somewhat short of providing credibly unbiased estimates of 
the effects of EM. This is driven by issues of methodological rigorousness, small sample sizes and 
probably also what Renzema (2013:249) calls “the slippery nature of EM” – “EM” is not an exclusive 
label, and a quite diverse selection of programs fall within it. Two of the most important distinctions 
between EM programs are their so-called “net widening”8 effect, as well as their inclusion of 
rehabilitative activities/treatments. Evaluations of EM programs in the other Scandinavian countries, 
which are similar to the Norwegian program, suggest that EM can indeed be an effective way to 
reduce recidivism. Sweden implemented front-door EM in the mid 1990’s and back-door EM in 2001, 
and while we have not been able to locate any evaluations of the front-door implementation, Marklund 
and Holmberg (2009) find, using a matched control design, that those admitted to the a back-door 
program recidivate to a significantly less extent than those serving their entire sentence in prison. 
Denmark implemented a front-door EM program targeted at traffic offenders in 2005, which was 
extended to also include young offenders (under the age of 25) in 2006 before EM was made 
universally available in 2008. Comparing offenders with similar offending records and current offence 
characteristics, Jørgensen (2011) finds that the young offenders who were targeted in this second 
reform have significantly lower recidivism rates and intensities if their sentence started after EM 
became available to them. Moreover, two studies using regression discontinuity designs indicate that 
the Danish program has increased upper secondary education completion rates (Larsen, 2016) and 
decreased social welfare dependency9 rates (Andersen and Andersen, 2014) among (male) offenders in 
the same age group. Together, these findings suggest that completing a sentence on EM can improve 
                                                     
8 The term net-widening is commonly used in critical criminology to describe the process wherein correctional programs are 
implemented in ways that increase the total number of people who are subject to correctional control. An EM program is 
typically net-widening if it is implemented as a supplement rather than an alternative to existing programs (Blomberg and 
Mestre, 2014).  
9The authors argue that social welfare dependency is almost always synonymous with unemployment in a social democratic 
welfare state such as in Denmark, and that the study hence can be interpreted as an investigation of the effect of electronic 
monitoring on unemployment (Andersen and Andersen, 2014:353). 
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the transition from prison life to outside life, and that serving on EM rather than in prison can reduce 
the stigma associated with a prison history.  
Two existing studies from Norway show that those on EM have lower recidivism rates when 
compared to offenders serving short unconditional sentences in prison (Rasmussen et al., 2016) and to 
all NCS clients (c.f. Rokkan, 2012b; Graunbøl et al., 201010). However, both these evaluations have 
relatively low internal validity (Sherman et al., 1997), and the selection (on unobservables) into EM 
makes it difficult to interpret the results causally. The causal effect of EM on recidivism in Norway 
therefore remains unknown. We address these obvious sources of selection bias in two ways. First, we 
apply a difference-in-differences approach contrasting the change in recidivism from before to after 
introduction of the EM program across similar convicts in counties offering and not offering EM. 
Second, we use the temporal expansion in the number of available ankle bands to instrument for being 
on EM. By using these transparent approaches to elicit credible causal effect estimates of EM we hope 
to complement the existing literature from the other Scandinavian countries as well as to provide 
useful insights to other countries that seek to implement EM as part of their non-custodial penal 
policies. 
2.1 Serving time at home or in prison: Why should it matter for reoffending? 
The main question we seek to answer in this study is whether serving a sentence on EM (i.e. outside 
prison) instead of in prison changes post-sentence reoffending behavior. Numerous possible reasons 
for this are present in the criminological literature, and in the following we structure these into seven 
main theoretical mechanisms. Although unable to empirically test the validity of each of these 
mechanisms separately, we argue that careful subsample analysis can provide some insight into their 
relative explanatory power. We suggest that age, previous imprisonment and social integration are 
three such moderator variables that could provide insights into why or how EM increases or reduces 
recidivism, and do therefore structure our subsample analysis accordingly. 
2.1.1 Electronic monitoring reduces recidivism 
Several arguments suggest that serving a sentence on EM instead of in prison will reduce recidivism. 
First, to serve ones sentence outside of prison makes it possible to avoid the negative consequences of 
serving (or having served) time behind bars. Such negative effects have received plentiful attention in 
the literature, and include psychological factors (Schnittker and John, 2007), the loss of (or lack of 
growth in) human capital (Lopoo and Western, 2005; Western, Kling and Weiman, 2001), the 
accumulation of criminal capital in the form of e.g. peer relations and skills, (see e.g. Bayer, 
Hjalmarson and Pozen, 2009; Morselli, 2009), as well as stigmatization by family, friends and 
employers post release (Grogger, 1995; Pager, 2003; LeBel, 2011). All of these are damaging effects 
                                                     
10 See Kristoffersen (2013) for a summary in English. 
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that could be avoided if the offender serves his or her sentence outside prison, and we will in the 
following refer to this as the protection mechanism. If relevant, we expect to see stronger effects in 
two related groups of offenders: those who are young and those who have not previously been 
imprisoned. This is based on an assumption that EM will keep these offenders out of prison at an age 
and/or point in their criminal career when their social relations, networks and identities have not yet 
been altered by spending time behind bars. Jørgensen’s (2011) and Andersen and Andersen’s (2014) 
findings of a beneficial effect of EM for young offenders can suggest that such a mechanism is 
important.  
 
Second, to serve ones sentence outside of prison makes it possible to maintain social bonds to family, 
friends, employers and other actors in “conventional” society during atonement. Advocates of social 
control theories (Hirschi, 1969; Samson and Laub, 1993, Laub and Sampson 2003) highlight these 
bonds – and especially the informal ones – as important prerequisites if the individual is to refrain 
from criminal activities. The potential for EM to reduce recidivism through the maintenance of such 
social bonds will in the following be referred to as the integration mechanism. If such a mechanism is 
relevant we would expect to see stronger effects among offenders who have strong social ties to family 
and/or employment to maintain, as suggested by the findings of Killias et al. (2010). 
 
Third, and based on the knowledge that the offender voluntarily applies to serve on EM, one might 
argue that the opportunity to serve the sentence as desired can serve as a so-called “hook for change” 
(Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph, 2002). A “hook for change” is defined as a structural 
opportunity that – if seized by the individual – can serve as a catalyst for change in the offender’s 
criminal trajectory.11 As one can expect higher age and previous prison experience to proxy a stage in 
the life course and/or criminal career where the desire to change is more substantial than earlier on (cf. 
the phenomenon of aging out of crime), we expect this mechanism – which we refer to as the hook for 
change mechanism – to create stronger declines in recidivism among older offenders and offenders 
with at least one previous imprisonment.   
 
Fourth and finally, and with a focus on the contents and context of the rehabilitative activities in EM, 
one additional crime-reducing mechanism can be outlined. To serve on EM requires the offender to 
follow a weekly schedule of work and other prosocial activities, which may – as compared to 
rehabilitative activities performed in prison – establish and teach the offender everyday skills (such as 
time management) that could be more directly transferable to post-sentence life. We refer to this as the 
skill mechanisms, and if relevant, we expect to see stronger effects among offenders who have weak 
                                                     
11 This concept hence places more focus on agency than e.g. Sampson and Laub’s (1993) concept of “turning points”. 
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social ties prior to serving the sentence. This is based upon the assumption that EM provides such 
everyday skills and employment relationships to those who could benefit from them the most.  
2.1.2 Electronic monitoring increases recidivism 
Several arguments also suggest that serving on EM instead of in prison will increase recidivism. Based 
on deterrence theory or rational choice theory (e.g. Becker, 1968; Nagin, 1998), sentences need to be 
tough in order for them to work – as only harsher sentences will motivate or deter or the offender from 
reoffending.12 Based on these theories, under what we will call the deterrence mechanism, EM might 
increase recidivism insofar as offenders perceive a sentence served on EM as less harsh than a 
sentence served in prison. A recent qualitative evaluation of the Norwegian program shows that 
serving on EM by no means is experienced as effortless (Rasmussen et al., 2016), but the choice to 
serve on EM still suggests that it is perceived preferable to imprisonment. We would expect the 
deterrence mechanism to create stronger effects among younger offenders and offenders without 
previous prison experience, as the presumably more lenient character of the EM program is 
experienced at a point in time when their benchmark for (re)offending costs is yet to be formed.  
Moreover, we expect to see larger effects among offenders with strong social ties given that EM can 
make the atonement so similar to everyday life that its specific deterring effect is negligible. 
 
Second, to serve on EM can increase recidivism because it enables the co-occurrence of capable 
offenders and criminogenic settings (and possibly also former co-offenders) more than would a 
sentence served in prison (see e.g. Wikström, 2004). While it is indeed possible to commit crimes 
while in prison, and while the activity requirement in the EM program ensures that the offender does 
not roam around freely, one can argue that the opportunities to commit crimes nonetheless are more 
plentiful on EM. Relatedly, to serve on EM blurs the boundaries between the work/family sphere and 
the criminal sphere more than would an incarceration, and this has been shown to complicate the 
transition back to everyday life (e.g. Sørensen and Kyvsgaard, 2009). We will in the following refer to 
this as the situational mechanism, and we expect it to create stronger increases in recidivism among 
offenders with previous imprisonments (i.e. offenders who have already recidivated at least once in the 
environment in which the sentence on EM is served) and offenders who are married or employed prior 
to atonement (i.e. offenders whose separation between criminal life and conventional life can be 
blurred by EM).  
 
                                                     
12 The idea that tough sentencing reduces reoffending on the individual level is in the literature referred to as specific 
deterrence, while the deterring effect on the public in general is referred to as general deterrence. Although we focus on the 
specific deterrence effect in our argument, it is important to note that the introduction of EM could increase recidivism also 
among offenders serving in prison or in the public in general insofar as it reduce the expected costs of offending and hereby 
lower general deterrence.   
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Finally, and based on the everyday nature of the rehabilitative contents of the EM program, to serve on 
EM might create feelings of alienation, frustration and distrust among offenders who struggle or fail to 
comply with the contents of EM (Agnew , 1992; 2001). Returns to prison due to technical violations 
are rare (Øster and Rokkan, 2012), but that does not mean that the pressure of “ordinariness” while on 
EM can be alienating to some. This might in turn increase risks of social deviance and/or reoffending, 
and we hence refer to this as the strain mechanism. Based on the assumption that strain is something 
that builds up over time, we expect this mechanism to manifest itself through stronger increases in 
recidivism among older offenders, offenders with previous imprisonment and/or offenders with weak 
social integration, as these groups are likely to have struggled with similar issues also in the past.  
2.1.3 Theoretical expectations: Summary 
We have summarized all seven mechanisms, the direction of their anticipated effect on recidivism as 
well as their expected validation in the three subsamples in Table 1 below.13 For instance, we expect 
the protection mechanism to reduce recidivism, and this effect to be either only present or stronger (i.e. 
more negative) among young offenders and offenders without previous imprisonments. It is worth 
noticing that the same aspects of EM can be expected to produce quite different results within the 
same group, depending on the mechanism. For instance, the very aspects of EM that are expected to be 
crime-reducing for adult offenders in the hook for change mechanism are expected to be criminogenic 
in the strain mechanism.  
 
Table 1: Theoretical mechanisms and expected subsample variations 
Mechanism Direction Age Prev. imprisonment Social integration 
  Young Old None One or more Weak Strong 
Hook for change -  X  X   
Integration -      X 
Protection - X  X    
Skill -     X  
Deterrence + X  X   X 
Situational +    X  X 
Strain +  X  X X  
 
We will return to this table in Section 7.1, where we discuss the theoretical implications of our 
findings further. We now move on to a more detailed description of the EM policy in Norway as well 
as the socio-political context in which it was implemented.  
                                                     
13 It is also possible that the effect of an unconditional prison sentence is the same irrespective of whether it is served on EM 
or in prison, for example if living under constant risk of supervision (like EM) has the same effect on recidivism as being 
under constant supervision (like in prison); cf. the idea of Panopticon (Foucault, 1977). 
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3 The Norwegian context 
All custodial and non-custodial sentences in Norway are carried out by The Norwegian Correctional 
Service (NCS), a government agency financed by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The 
activities of the NCS are built upon the so-called “normality principle”14, holding reintegration and 
rehabilitation as core goals (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2015). These goals are pursued by 
providing education, work training, health care, financial guidance and various programs during 
atonement, as well as by collaborating with other welfare providers outside the correctional system.15  
 
The NCS is structured into regional units with between three and five counties in each, and has a total 
prison capacity of just below 4000 places distributed between 43 prisons. High capacity demands are 
typically driving utilization rates closer to 100 percent (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2014, pp. 33-
34), leaving Norway with an incarceration rate of approximately 70 per 100 000 (World Prison Brief, 
2016). The challenges to meet the demands for prison capacity have been addressed – although 
admittedly not solved – by e.g. building new prisons, allowing for cell-sharing, implementing early 
release policies, increasing resources to probation and parole, renting capacity in prisons abroad, as 
well as implementing EM.  
 
Approximately 7000 unconditional prison sentences to either prison or preventive detention16 are 
initiated in Norwegian prisons each year, and Bhuller et al. (2016) document that prisoners in Norway 
have broadly similar observable characteristics as prisoners in other countries. However, there are two 
main factors that set the Norwegian system apart. First, most offenders serve relatively short prison 
sentences - the average conviction length in the period we consider was between 141 and 183 days 
(Statistics Norway, 2016c) – and probation laws enable sentences of 60 days or more to be terminated 
after 2/3 time as long as conditions of good behavior etc. are met. Second, Norway does – to quite a 
large extent – incarcerate traffic offenders. This is a particularly low risk population that falls within 
the target group of EM (Rokkan, 2012a), making the issue of selection particularly relevant. For 
instance, the practice of incarcerating traffic offenders is one of the main reasons why Norway can 
showcase the lowest recidivism rate among the Nordic countries (see Graunbøl et al., 2010).  
                                                     
14 The normality principle can be summarized in three main points; that the punishment is the restriction of liberty, meaning 
that the offender maintains the same rights as all others who live in Norway; that no one shall serve sentences under stricter 
circumstances than necessary; and that the “inside life” should resemble “outside life” as much as possible (Norwegian 
Correctional Service, 2015).  
15 For a more thorough overview of the NCS’s values and practices, see White paper 37 (2007/2008).  
16 Preventive detention is an indefinite sentence that may be given to dangerous, accountable offenders in order to ensure 
public safety. The sentence is rare, and only given to a handful offenders each year (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2012).  
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3.1 The EM implementation 
EM was put forward as an alternative way of serving an unconditional prison sentence already in 1998 
(White paper nr. 27 (1997-1998)), primarily prompted by the challenges of the prison system to meet 
the demands for prison capacity (Rokkan, 2012b). Moreover, EM was promoted as a key measure to 
ensure a positive development in the lives of (re)offenders, with a presumed potential to enhance the 
possibilities for rehabilitation and a crime-free life (Rokkan, 2012a).   
The EM intervention was initially introduced as a pilot project in six17 of Norway’s nineteen counties 
in September 2008, leaving the remaining counties unaffected. The six participating counties were 
then given about 20 ankle bands each, before the capacity was expanded by 10 bands in two of the 
counties in 2010. In 2011 four more counties were enrolled, leaving the total capacity at 215 ankle 
bands until one more county was enrolled in October 2012 and a national implementation began in 
May 2014. The local implementation dates and capacities (i.e. the number of ankle bands) are 
summarized in Table 2, and the total capacity and number of offenders starting a sentence on EM in 
the treatment and comparison counties in Figure 1. Our data on EM (which include the 2008-2011 
cohorts) enable us to use all three changes occurring before the 2012 extension, providing us with 
variation in EM eligibility (0/1) as well as EM capacity (number of bands per county) over both time 
and place. 
 
Table 2: Stages in the Norwegian EM implementation (Rokkan 2012b) 
County Date Capacity 
Vestfold September 1 2008 22 
Oslo 
 
Oslo/Akershusa 
September 22 2008 
January 1 2010 
October 1 2011 
21 
31 
46 
Hedmark October 6 2008 22 
Rogaland October 20 2008 
January 1 2010 
21 
31 
Troms November 3 2008 22 
Sogn og Fjordane November 17 2008 22 
Hordaland April 1 2011 30 
Agder October 1 2011 20 
Oppland October 1 2012 20 
National May 1 2014 121 
a: When implementing EM in 2011, Akershus went into a collaboration with the existing EM county in their 
region (Oslo). This meant that the overall capacity of the region increased, while the ankle bands had to be 
shared between two counties rather than one. This was also a common procedure when the program was 
extended to the whole country in 2014. 
3.2 Admission to EM 
In the Norwegian system electronic monitoring is not a sentence given by a judge; it is a way of serving 
an unconditional prison sentence. As such, all offenders who live18 in a county offering EM and are to 
                                                     
17 One county in each of the Correctional Service’s six regional units was included. The counties were selected by the 
Regional offices in cooperation with the regional labor unions. 
18 Note that it is the place of residence and not the place of offence that determines eligibility (Norwegian Correctional 
Service, 2013, § 7-9). 
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serve19 an unconditional prison sentence of no more than four months are informed that they can apply to 
the NCS in order to serve their sentence on EM instead of in prison. Øster and Rokkan (2012) show that 
nearly 80 percent of this target group applies, and that just over half of the applicants are accepted (c.f. 
Rasmussen et al., 2016). The admission process comprises two main steps; one determining whether the 
applicant falls within the target group or not, and one determining whether he or she is deemed fit to 
serve the sentence outside of prison. This latter step is based on a personal aptitude assessment, which 
is carried out by the NCS staff (see Section 3.4 below and Norwegian Correctional Service (2013, § 7-
9) for more details). This selection process implies that the offenders who are accepted to serve on EM 
differ, by intention of the admission process, from those not accepted, and these differences are likely 
to both be correlated with recidivism and to be inadequately captured by observable control variables. 
It is therefore crucial for causal interpretations to use variation from the geographical and temporal 
expansion of the program, and not whether an individual served on EM or not.  
 
The total number of initiated sanctions on EM over time is displayed in Figure 1, along with the 
development in total capacity. For the number of initiated sanctions broken down by county, see Table 
1.2 in Skardhamar (2013, p. 8). 
 
Figure 1: Total number of ankle bands (Rokkan 2012b) and the number of initiated sanctions on 
front-door EM in treatment and comparison counties in the NCS data (Norwegian Correctional 
Service, 2008), 2002-2011. Absolute numbers 
 
 
The implementation in September 2008 is clearly evident in that the number of sanctions on (front-
door) EM as well as the total capacity is zero for all counties for all previous months. There is a 
                                                     
19 Both those who were convicted after the program was introduced and those who were waiting to serve a prison sentence at 
the time of introduction, were eligible.  
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gradual increase in the number of initiated sanctions after the introduction, which stabilizes after about 
6 months. As most of our analyses are based on calendar year, we therefore expect to see an effect of 
EM on recidivism in 2009 at the earliest. It is worth noticing that there are some offenders who live in 
the comparison counties that serve on EM (cf. Skardhamar, 2013), but that these numbers are low.20  
The middle, stipulated line represent the number of sanctions on EM that are initiated each month, but 
as the average time spent on EM is 29 days, we can expect this to be rather  similar to the total number 
of offenders on EM within a given month. Hence, the full capacity is not being used, although we see 
an increase in the number of initiated sanctions as the capacity is expanded both in 2010 and 2011.21 
Rasmussen et al. (2016) find that the capacity utilization increased over time in all counties, but that 
there are persisting differences between counties in how many bands they have available. These 
differences are reflected in that only the counties with high capacity utilization increased their capacity 
in 2010, while the others did not (see Table 2). 
3.3 Serving on EM 
The EM program in Norway uses radio frequency technology, which is based on signals being sent 
from a locked ankle band to a stationary communication unit installed somewhere within the 
offender’s home.22 In addition to wearing the ankle band, employees of the NCS make unannounced 
visits to both the offender’s home and workplace numerous times a week. The offender is obliged to 
provide urine samples for alcohol and drug tests, and alcohol and any kind of substance use is strictly 
forbidden (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2013).  
 
In addition to the locked ankle band, the Norwegian EM program also includes a substantial focus on 
qualitative contents. To serve on EM is hence not comparable to a mere house arrest, and it is a 
requirement that the offender engages in three main activities; 1) between 15 and 40 hours of “activity”, 
typically work outside of the home, per week,23 2) appointments as arranged by NCS, including drug 
programs etc., and 3) voluntary activities related to personal needs (e.g. grocery shopping, doctor’s 
appointments etc.). These activities are structured into a weekly time schedule that is developed in 
collaboration between the offender and a correctional officer. Any failure to comply with the schedule 
                                                     
20 In principle this could bias the recidivism in the comparison group, which in our case would entail that we slightly 
underestimate any beneficial effects of EM.  
21 Note that some bands are used by offenders who end their sentence on EM, i.e. by the back-door component of the 
program. The total capacity utilization is therefore slightly higher than seen in this figure.  
22 This technology ensures physical proximity between the sender and receiver at times during the day when the offender 
should be indoors, but it does not provide information about the exact whereabouts as would e.g. GPS technology. See e.g. 
Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005) for a discussion of different technologies used in EM systems, and Rokkan (2012a) for an 
overview of the debate on technology in Norway.  
23 “Activity” is broadly defined, and includes enrollment in school, education, participation in programs and volunteering, in 
addition to regular, paid work (Rokkan, 2012b). NCS assists offenders in finding suitable work if they cannot do so 
themselves.  
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offsets the electronic alarm, and is seen as a violation of the EM conditions. Based on the character of the 
violation, the offender might have to serve the remainder of the sentence in prison.24  
3.4 Eligibility 
The Norwegian EM program is largely inspired by those in Sweden and Denmark, where EM was 
implemented as an alternative to short-medium custodial sentences in 1994 and 2006, respectively 
(Rokkan, 2012b). In order to qualify for EM, all offenders (at least age 1825) must meet numerous 
formal conditions as well as passing a more discretionary and individual judgment conducted by the 
NCS. 
 
The main formal requirement is that the current unconditional prison sentence(s) (for which the 
offender applies for EM) has to be no more than 4 months/120 days long in total. Moreover, the 
offender should, as a main rule, not be convicted of sexual crimes, violent crimes or crimes committed 
from the home or against any family members. The prison sentence could not be a result of violation 
of conditions in a previous sentence (e.g. violation of requirements in a parole, community service, 
drug program, etc.) (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2013). 
 
More discretionary, the type and severity of any previous offenses should be taken into account when 
the NCS evaluates the application. Emphasis is placed on against whom the offenses were committed, 
whether any previous offense would disqualify for EM, as well as the time passed since the 
commitment of any previous offense (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2013).  
 
There are also some formal requirements related to the offender’s living conditions while serving on 
EM, including that the offender has a permanent work or residence permit in Norway, and that he or 
she is not formally deported from the country. Somewhat more discretionary, he or she must have a 
suitable place of residence in an EM county, though holiday houses, rental homes and occasionally 
also the homes of family or friends might be approved as long as they have electricity, running water 
and sufficient phone coverage for the EM technology to work. The written consent from any 
household member over the age of 18 is required.  
 
Finally, the offender has to agree to the activity and time schedule described in Section 3.3. All 
technological equipment is provided by NCS, meaning that no financial responsibility is placed on the 
offender.  
                                                     
24 Returns to prison are rare, and occurred in less than 5 percent of the sanctions served on EM between 2008 and 2012 (Øster 
and Rokkan, 2012).  
25 None of the formal requirements – only a more discretionary individual evaluation – were imposed for offenders who were 
younger than 18 at the time of application.  
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4 Empirical strategies 
The goal of this analysis is to provide plausible estimates of causal effects of EM on recidivism, by 
means of quasi-experimental designs.26 By intention of the program and by the evaluation process 
wherein the NCS staff undertakes informed and competent judgments about who to admit to EM, we 
expect offenders admitted to reoffend less than those rejected. While some of these differences may be 
adequately captured by observable control variables, crucial differences between offenders are likely 
based on unobservable, discretionary judgments that we cannot adequately capture by including controls. 
Hence, we will use two related quasi-experimental methods to try to credibly elicit causal effects of EM 
on recidivism: difference-in-differences and instrumental variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
4.1 Difference-in-Differences analysis 
The difference-in-differences (DD) estimator contrasts the change in recidivism from before to after 
the introduction of EM across a treatment and comparison group. The main idea behind this strategy is 
that changes in recidivism in the pilot counties that are not caused by the EM implementation can be 
adequately captured by contrasting these changes to the corresponding changes in a group of counties 
that did not implement EM. In its simplest form the DD-model would use one pre and one post period 
defined by the same date in both the treatment and comparison group, e.g. the September 1 2008 
official implementation date. However, the current EM program went through three main changes in 
the period between 2008 and 2011, and to limit the analysis to the 2008 implementation would discard 
a lot of variation (and observations) that would increase the precision and power of our results. We 
therefore choose to expand the basic DD approach and apply the following DD model: 
 
yi,t = α+ β countyi + τ timet + λ treatXposti,t + µ Xi + εi,t                     (1) 
 
The outcome variable (yi,t) denotes recidivism for offender i 1-3 years after release. We allow for more 
flexibility than a traditional treat-dummy by including one dummy for each of the counties of 
residence (countyi). 27 We also control flexibly for time, and include dummies for calendar year (2002-
2011) and calendar month (1-12), as well as their interaction (timet). This allows us to account very 
flexibly for time trends in recidivism, both over years and by season.  Mainly with the intention to 
improve precisions, we will also control for the exogenous variables sex, age when starting the 
sentence and conviction length (X). The error term εi,t is assumed to have conditional mean zero.  
                                                     
26 The ideal – but typically not available – design to estimate causal effects would be a random assignment of eligible 
offenders into a treatment group serving on EM and a control group serving in prison. The literature on quasi-experiments, to 
which we carefully align, does instead emphasize the advantages of relying on variation that can be transparently judged as 
exogenous or not, rather than applying traditional regression methods with control variables for estimation in such a non-
experimental setting (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
27 Selection into the treatment counties is a key concern. Please see sensitivity analysis in Section 6.4. 
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The variable treatXposti,t is set to 1 for offenders who lived in a county offering EM and who began 
the sentence after the county had started offering EM (zero otherwise). The parameter of interest λ 
thus captures the overall average effect on recidivism resulting from a county offering EM. This 
estimates the so-called intention to treat effect (ITT), which is the average effect of offering EM over 
both those who actually served on EM and those who still served in prison. Since we have little or no 
reason to expect any effect of offering EM on those who actually did not serve on EM, the ITT 
underestimates the effect of serving on EM on recidivism (we address the plausibility of this 
assumption more closely in Section 4.2).  
4.1.1 Identifying assumptions 
The main identifying assumption for the DD-approach is that the trends in recidivism would have been 
the same in the treatment and comparison counties had the treatment counties not introduced EM. 
There are several potential threats to this assumption. First, there may be unique features of the EM 
counties that made them preferred counties for the EM pilot, and insofar as these factors are also 
related to recidivism, the DD estimator may erroneously attribute any observed effects on recidivism 
to EM rather than to these other factors. We have not seen any such considerations being mentioned in 
official descriptions of the EM implementation (e.g. Øster og Rokkan, 2012), but we nonetheless 
explore the relevance of such concerns by checking for patterns in recidivism rates just before the 
introduction of EM.28 Note that any secular trend would only introduce bias in our effect estimates to 
the extent that the temporal patterns were not also present in the comparison counties. 
 
Second, and relatedly, there might have been other correctional changes occurring around the same time as 
the EM implementation that may also affect recidivism. EM counties might for instance start offering 
additional programs; or, the counties not offering EM may start offering something else instead. We are not 
aware of any such programs, and the funding of EM was “fresh” in the sense that it was added to the 
national budget, it did hence not distract resources from neither the offering nor the non-offering counties 
(White paper nr. 37 (2007/2008)). Relatedly, judges may change their behavior and issue more (or less) 
unconditional sentences after the EM implementation, in particular in “borderline” cases that would 
otherwise have been fit for e.g. community service. If so, the population of convicted offenders in the EM 
counties would comprise marginally less (or more) crime-prone offenders than in the counties without EM, 
possibly biasing our estimates. To explore the relevance of this, we use a version of Eq. (1) to estimate 
effects of EM on unconditional prison, conditional prison29 and community service; see Section 6.4.2.  
                                                     
28 Information on unmet demands on the prison system (e.g. waiting lists for the serving of sentences) would also be relevant, 
but this is unfortunately not available on the county level and can therefore not be explored. 
29 This is a prison sentence that is postponed for a given trial/probation period (typically 2 years). If the offender does not 
reoffend or break other conditions as set by the court during this period, the prison sentence is seen as served; if not, the 
remainder of the sentence must be served in prison. As such, a conditional prison sentence bears resemblance to probation in 
the US system. 
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Third, offenders might self-select into the counties offering EM (e.g. by moving) or into the post-
period (e.g. by trying to postpone the serving due to knowledge of the upcoming EM introduction). To 
explore the possible relevance of such composition effects, we rerun all analyses based on the county 
of residence the year before EM was known to be introduced, hereby disabling such self-selection. 
This procedure would have the advantage of reducing bias due to self-selecting, but since it attributes 
some offenders to a county offering (/not offering) EM, it would attenuate any effect estimates. 
Moreover, we examine whether moving patterns in our sample suggest that people move to EM 
counties in order to qualify; see Section 6.4.  
4.2 Instrumental variable analyses 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimators rely on sources of exogenous variation in an endogenous 
explanatory variable (being on EM or not) to consistently estimate the effect of the explanatory 
variable on the outcome variable (recidivism). The main idea behind this method in our setting, is that 
being admitted to EM or not is endogenous at the individual level (admission at the discretion of the 
NCS officer), but that the offering and capacity of EM in the offenders’ county provides an exogenous 
increase in these offenders’ likelihood of actually serving on EM. In the following we will utilize the 
variation from the number of bands available in each county, hence including not only the expansion 
from zero but also later extensions in the number of ankle bands. Since this model utilizes more 
variation than the mere implementation (captured by the treatXpost parameter in model 1), we expect 
it to better predict EM and thus provide more precise estimates.30 Under the assumption that the EM 
capacity does not affect recidivism in any other way than through EM, we can use the increase to 
consistently estimate an effect on recidivism of serving on EM.  
 
The approach can be illustrated in by the following model, which is estimated using 2SLS: 
 
EMi,t = α+ β countyi + τ timet + λ bandsi(c),t + µ Xi + εi,t                     (2a) 
 
yi,t = a+ b 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸� i,t + c countyi + d timet + e Xi + fi,t                      (2b) 
 
In the first stage (2a) whether the offender serves on EM (1) or not (0) is estimated using variation 
from the introduction and expansion of EM, where bandsi(c),t specifies the number of bands available in 
the county of the offender at time t. In the second stage (2b) the effect of serving on EM on recidivism 
is estimated using predicted – not actual – EM, i.e. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�  from the first step. The parameter of interest is 
now b, which captures the effect of actually serving on EM on recidivism. This estimates the so-called 
local average treatment effect (LATE), which is the average effect of serving on EM (instead of 
                                                     
30 We have also run the IV analysis using the implementation (treatXpost) as instrument in the first step, and this does – as 
expected – decrease precision somewhat but have no substantial implications for the qualitative results. 
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prison) on recidivism for those who are moved from prison to EM by the introduction and expansion 
of the EM program.  
4.2.1 Identifying assumptions 
The IV requires a valid first stage, mainly meaning that the number of bands (including the DD case 
where bands go from zero to a positive number) significantly predicts the probability of serving on 
EM. This can be tested in the data, and F-tests from all first stage models are included in Appendix D. 
The main identifying assumption, which needs to be assumed and cannot be tested in the data, is the 
so-called “exclusion restriction”, i.e. that the offering of EM has no independent effect on 
recidivism.31 Specifically, this means that the variable bands in Eq. (2a) can be excluded from Eq. 
(2b).  
 
There are several reasons to be concerned with the validity of the exclusion restriction in our setting. 
First, if EM with associated activity requirements (work, education) affects those in prison (i.e. in non 
EM-counties), e.g. if it makes it harder for them to obtain work after release, the EM program may 
also raise their subsequent crime. This seems, however, far-fetched in our setting. Second, the number 
of bands may be correlated with underlying factors, which are inadequately captured by the 
observables in Eq. (2a), implying biased estimates. Though it is hard to see what underlying factors 
this might be, this cannot be fully ruled out. Third, if EM is perceived as less punitive than prison and 
hereby reduces general deterrence, recidivism may increase as EM is introduced and expanded. In 
isolation this may contribute to a bias in our estimates of effects of serving on EM on crime. There is 
no way we can explore this further, but general deterrence effects – though prominent in theory – are 
notoriously hard to document credibly in empirical work (Telle, 2013). Relatedly, and as mentioned 
above, if judges become more prone to unconditional sentences when knowing that EM is available, 
this can increase general deterrence. We will explore changes in sentencing practices in Section 6.4.2. 
4.3 Standard Errors  
Traditional estimates of standard errors assume that the error terms in Equations (1) and (2) are 
independent across observations. This assumption may not hold in our situation, as outlined by e.g. 
Cameron and Miller (2015). In the following we will therefore allow error terms to be correlated 
                                                     
31 Consistent estimates require the fulfilment of two other assumptions; Monotonicity and the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA). Monotonicity, i.e. that there should be no “defiers” in the EM group, ensure that the sign of the effect 
of the EM program on actual EM is the same for all observations. In our setting it seems innocent to assume that the 
introduction of EM or the increase in capacity did not decrease the likelihood of serving on EM for any offenders. SUTVA 
requires that the treatment status of one unit does not affect the potential outcomes of other units, and that the treatments for 
all units are comparable. The treatment should be equal for all units in that they all get the same number of days on EM as 
they should have served in prison, and interference between offenders should be minimized by the treatment being delivered 
without offenders being in touch with each other. We hence see it as unlikely that these assumptions compromise our results.  
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within counties and years (cluster on county and year), and we will also undertake some checks of 
robustness on how to cluster (see Section 6.4).  
5 Data 
5.1 Data sources 
The data for this analysis are retrieved from NCS’s own databases (Norwegian Correctional Service, 
2008), Statistics Norway’s crime statistics (Statistics Norway, 2015, 2016a, 2016b), and the event 
history database FD-trygd (Akselsen, Lien and Siverstøl, 2007). Information from the various sources 
are combined using the unique personal identification number (PIN) issued to all Norwegian residents 
and immigrants with permanent residency. This leaves us with a population-wide dataset covering all 
sanctioned offenders apart from e.g. tourists, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants without a valid 
PIN.32 The data management process is done in three main steps. 
 
First, the NCS’s databases on custodial and non-custodial sanctions (Norwegian Correctional Service, 
2008) are used to define our sample. We include all sentence records33 from unconditional prison 
sentences that are served either in prison or on EM, as long as they have a starting date between 
January 1 2002 and December 31 2011 (which is the latest date available to us in our data). This 
leaves us with a total of 58 694 records, whereof 2 448 have been served on EM. For these records we 
keep information on EM status (whether the sentence has been serving on EM or in prison), the type 
of offence (violence, drug, etc.), the start and ending dates of the sentence, as well as the conviction 
length. As the reoffence data (Statistics Norway, 2015) are available until December 31 2013, the 
entire sample except for those who start their sentence in November and December 2011 (N=105) is 
followed for at least 24 months. We choose to start the follow-up in 2002 to allow for a sufficient 
account of pre-implementation trends, while at the same time avoiding a break in the crime statistics 
from 2001 to 2002.  
 
Second, we use register data as maintained by Statistics Norway to restrict the NCS data and define 
our main analytic sample. Crime data (Statistics Norway, 2015, 2016a, 2016b) are used to account for 
previous offending and sanctioning. Moreover, demographic and socioeconomic information is 
retrieved from the population wide database FD-trygd (see Akselsen, Lien and Siverstøl, 2007) to 
account for eligibility criteria that are related to e.g. age and county of residence. We also use this 
                                                     
32 People without a permanent residence permit do not qualify for EM, and this should hence be unproblematic. 
33 Keeping all records mean that a few (re)offenders are represented in the data more than once; in the final analytic sample, 
97 percent of the offenders are repeated once and 3 percent twice. This introduces dependence across observations for the 
same individual, a problem that is to some extent handled by our clustering on county and year. Nevertheless, we have also 
done the main analysis clustering on individual, yielding virtually identical results.  
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database to collect information for control variables and sub-sample analyses, like sex, marital status 
and employment.  
 
Third, the crime statistic on investigated offences (Statistics Norway, 2015) is used to measure 
reoffending. This statistic includes one record for each committed offence with a known primary 
suspect at the end of the police investigation, providing us with a complete picture of registered 
(re)offending defined as the commitment of a new crime (and not a technical violation etc.). We prefer 
these data (as opposed to e.g. (re)imprisonment data) as they, first, capture less severe crime and, 
second, include information on the date of (re)offence, which allows us to accurately measure the 
timing and extent of reoffending. However, it is important to remember that this is a front-end 
recidivism measure that will yield higher recidivism rates than more back-end measures such as 
reconvictions or reimprisonments. 
5.2 Defining variables  
This analysis relies on a wide set of variables, and we will in the following differentiate between 
outcome, assignment, moderator and control variables. 
5.2.1 Outcome variables 
The analysis seeks to estimate the effects of EM on recidivism, and while recidivism rates are the most 
common measure in existing research, it is often argued that this measure only captures a small part of 
a complicated and diverse phenomenon (Farrington and Davies, 2007; Harris, Lockwood and 
Mengers, 2009). For instance, if fewer people reoffend (and the recidivism rate goes down), it is hard 
to argue for beneficial effects on crime and reintegration if those who still reoffended commit more 
crimes, more serious crimes, and/or more harmful crimes. To provide a more nuanced account of 
reoffending behavior, we therefore measure recidivism by means of three various outcomes that are 
pivotal in the criminal career paradigm (Piquero, Farrington and Blumstein, 2003). All outcome 
variables are based on the statistics on investigated offences (Statistics Norway, 2015), and are defined 
as follows. 
 
First, we measure the recidivism rate as the proportion of the sample that commits at least one new 
offence within the follow-up period. This measure hence captures the criminal propensity in the 
sample. For those who do reoffend we include two additional measures. The recidivism intensity is 
measured as the total number of offences committed within the follow-up, giving an indication of the 
activity level of the offender. This measure is winsorized at the 95th percentile due to outliers, i.e. 
more extreme values are replaced by the value at the 95th percentile. Finally, the recidivism severity is 
measured as the most sever offence committed within the follow-up period. This measure is based on 
a severity indicator in the data on investigated offences, which is based on the maximum sentences in 
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the Criminal Code. It should be noted that this variable holds no direct interpretation, and only serves 
as a proxy. We choose to use the most sever offense (as opposed to e.g. the mean severity of all 
offences) to avoid that numerous petty crimes deflates the individual mean. As such, we attempt to 
measure the criminal capacity of the offender. In order to provide detailed accounts of reoffending, 
and to capture any tempo effects in our results, we measure reoffending for up to three years after 
release.34 However, only the counties that implemented EM in 2008 will contribute to the 3-year 
measurements, as data limitations restrict us from following the 2011 counties for more than 2 years. 
Hence, and as in most other recidivism studies (cf. Andersen and Skardhamar, 2015; Armstrong and 
McNeill, 2012; Farrington and Davies, 2007), we consider the 1- and 2- year measures to be our main 
outcomes. Descriptive statistics of our outcome variables are summarized in Table 3. 
5.2.2 Assignment variables 
The assignment variables are used to define our main analytic sample and determine the treatment 
status of each sentence record (i.e. whether it belongs in the treatment or comparison group, and in the 
pre or post period). 
 
County denotes the county in which the offender had his or her permanent address (as registered in the 
National Population Register) as of Jan 1 in the year the serving of the sentence was started. This 
information is used to determine EM eligibility/treatment status (treat=1). 
 
Time variables (calendar month and calendar year) are based on the date of starting the sentence.35 
These variables are used to assign sentences to EM eligibility, and post is set to 1 if the sentence is 
started on or after the date EM was implemented in a given county. Moreover, the calendar year and 
calendar month of starting the sentence, as well as their interaction (monthXyear), are included as 
dummies in order to control for time trends in recidivism over years and by season. 
 
Capacity denotes the total number of ankle bands that are available in the offender’s county of 
residence at his or her date of conviction. This capture both the transition from 0 to 1 (i.e. the 
implementation) and later extensions, and is included as a continuous36 instrumental variable in the IV 
analysis. Note that ankle bands cannot be transferred between counties unless in the rare occasions 
where they are located within the same NCS region (see Table 2).  
 
                                                     
34 Another option could be to start the clock at the starting date of the sentence, but few(er) offences (none in our sample) is 
committed while serving a sentence. 130 reoffences (whereof 2 are committed by someone on EM) are committed on the 
ending date, and while these theoretically could have been committed while in custody/under supervision, we see it as 
unlikely. These offences are captured by the recidivism measures we currently apply. 
35 We use the starting date rather than the conviction date to define the post-variable because this correctly ascribes offenders 
who had previously been convicted and were waiting to serve their sentence at the time of implementation to the post period. 
36 We tested other function forms as well; however, this did not substantially improve the model fit or alter the overall results. 
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The conviction length (in days) is drawn from the NCS data on custodial sentences, while we use the 
actual sentence length (in days) for those on EM due to data limitations. This is not ideal, as the NCS 
guidelines are based on conviction length, but the practical implications for our final sample are 
negligible.37 
 
The age (in years) when starting the sentence is calculated using the date of birth from the National 
Population Register and the starting date of the sentence in the NCS data. The EM guidelines are 
based on the age when applying for EM, but the application date is not available in our data. Short 
waiting time should limit the skewness in this variable. We use this variable to create the dummy 
under 18, which is set to 1 if the offender has not turned 18 at the time of starting the serving.  
 
The type of crime for which the offender is currently convicted is captured in two variables based on 
the offence category in the NCS data; Violent is set to 1 if the current offence is categorized as murder, 
attempted murder, violence, common or aggravated assault; and Sexual is set to 1 if the current 
offence is categorized as a rape, incest or sexual offence. 
 
The type(s) of crime(s) for which the offender has previously been sanctioned is retrieved from the 
statistic on criminal sanctions (Statistics Norway, 2016b). We use all court convictions with a 
conviction date prior to the current conviction date, and use information on the main offence in the 
conviction to set previous violent to 1 if the conviction was for a violent offence and previous sexual 
to 1 if the conviction was for a sexual offence.  
Information on previous imprisonments is retrieved from the statistics on imprisonments (Statistics 
Norway 2016a). We use all releases from both convictions and custody that have a release date prior 
to the current starting date, and set the dummy variable released24 to 1 if the offender has been 
released (from either conviction or custody) within 24 months of starting the current sentence.  
 
The NCS guidelines states that the offender should not have charges for new crimes cf. the Criminal 
Procedure Act § 822 (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2013, § 7-2). This event is proxied by the 
dummy variable recent charges, which is set to 1 if there are any records in the data of investigated 
offences (Statistics Norway, 2015) with an offence date between the current offence date and the 
starting date of the current sentence.  
 
Finally, the dummy variable during atonement is set to 1 if there are any records in the data of 
investigated offences (Statistics Norway, 2015) with an offence date during previous atonements as 
                                                     
37 The conviction and sentence length should only differ for those convicted to exactly 60 days (135 EM records and 1838 
prison records), due to this being the threshold for early release. 
25 
registered in the data on criminal sanctions (Statistics Norway, 2016b). This variable is used to capture 
previous offending while serving a sentence, as described in Norwegian Correctional Service (2013, 
§7-3). 
5.2.3 Moderator variables 
The moderator variables are used in our subsample analysis in order to assess the relevance of the 
mechanisms outlined in Section 2. As we recall, these should capture the offender’s age, social 
integration prior to starting the sentence, as well as previous prison experience. 
 
The offender’s age when starting the sentence is used to generate two dummy variables which form 
the basis of two separate subsample analyses. Max 25 is set to 1 if he or she is 25 years or younger and 
0 otherwise, and over 50 is set to 1 if the offender is 51 years or older when starting the sentence and 
to 0 otherwise. The groups in the two dummies are hence overlapping, and the goal is to explore 
theoretically interesting patterns in these subgroups (cf. Andersen and Andersen, 2014; Jørgensen, 
2011; Larsen, 2016) 
 
Social integration is proxied by two well-known sources of social control; labor market attachment 
and marital status (cf. Hirschi, 1969; Sampson and Laub, 1993; Laub and Sampson, 2003). Labor 
market attachment is captured using two different measures, both of which are based on information 
gathered the year prior to starting the sentence in order to avoid endogeneity. First, we set the 
dichotomous variable unemployed to 1 is the offender was registered as unemployed for at least 1 
month during this year.38 Second, we set the variable low income to 1 if the income from paid work 
(including wages and capital income) is less than 1 time the base rate of the National Insurance 
Scheme.39 The union status is captured in the dummy variable married, which is set to 1 if the 
offender is registered as married as of Jan 1 the year of starting the sentence and 0 otherwise. We do 
not have information on cohabitation, and single, divorced and cohabiting offenders are hence 
included in this comparison category.  
 
The dummy variable previously imprisoned is set to 1 if there is any release record from either a 
conviction and/or custody in the data on imprisonments (Statistics Norway, 2016a) that have a release 
date prior to the current starting date. We use all prison spells due to the assumptions of the protection 
mechanism.  
                                                     
38 We have tested whether there are variations depending on the number of months, but the significant importance seems to 
be between 0 and 1 month. 
39 This is an annually updated, inflation adjusted amount that is used to i.a. determine social benefit eligibility and calculate 
pensions. See e.g. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) for another example of using this amount to determine relative earnings.  
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5.2.4 Control variables 
With the main intention to improve precisions in our main models we use three control variables; the 
offenders sex (male=1), the age at starting serving the sentence and the conviction length (in days). 
The latter two variables are introduced as sets of dummies to avoid imposing restrictive functional 
forms. 
 
Additionally, we include four more control variables in our “naïve regression” (Section 6.2). The age 
at first offence (as registered in the data on investigated offences) is included as a continuous variable 
with quadratic terms. Previously imprisoned, low income and married are included as defined above.  
5.2.5 Sensitivity/robustness variables 
In our sensitivity and robustness checks we make use of additional variables. treatXpost-1 is a DD 
variable based on the county of residence the year before starting the sentence, which we use to assess 
possibly selective relocation of residency. In our analysis of judges’/courts’ practices we use four 
outcome variables; max120 is set to 1 if the offender is convicted to no more than 120 days of 
unconditional prison (either as the only sentence or a combination sentence), max60 is set to 1 if the 
offender is convicted to no more than 60 days of unconditional prison (either as the only sentence or a 
combination sentence), community service is set to 1 if the offender is convicted to community 
service, and conditional is set to 1 if the offender is convicted to a conditional prison sentence. In these 
models we use a DD-variable (treatXpost) based on the date of conviction.  
5.3 Defining main analytic sample 
The goal of our sampling process is to create treatment and comparison groups that are as similar as 
possible, in which all offenders would qualify for EM had EM been implemented. We start with all 
unconditional prison sentences served either in prison (N=56 246) or on EM (N=2448) with a starting 
date between January 1 2002 and December 31 2011 (N=58 694). The only clear-cut requirement in 
the official guidelines of the NCS (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2013) is that of a conviction 
length of no more than 120 days/4 months of unconditional prison, but applying only this criterion we 
are left with a total number of about 6000 sentences served in the treatment counties after EM was 
implemented – whereof only 39 percent were served on EM. It is therefore clear that the remaining, 
more discretionary requirement – or variables correlated with them – have been important in the 
assignment process as well, and we use these guidelines to further restrict our sample in the following 
way. 
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First, we operationalize as many of the guidelines40 as our data allows (see Section 5.2).  Second, we 
test the distribution of our operationalizations in the (actual) EM sample to explore how the guidelines 
have been practically executed by NCS staff. In doing so, we hope to move toward a sample of those 
who had a realistic chance of being admitted to EM. We find that the practices of NCS staff do indeed 
differ somewhat from what we could expect based on the guidelines, and we hence adapt our sample 
criteria accordingly (see Table 10 in Appendix A for a further description). In sum, we end up 
excluding offenders who are convicted to more than 60 days of unconditional prison; who are 
currently convicted for violent or sexual offenders, or who has been so in the past; who are less than 
18 years at the time of starting the sentence; who committed new offences between the time of 
conviction and starting the current sentence; who have reoffended during atonements in the past; and 
who have been released from prison within 24 months of the current conviction. We obviously impose 
the exact same requirements on all offenders regardless of their county of residence, EM status etc., 
and are left with a total of 24 329 sentence records in our main analytic sample, whereof 1857 are 
served on EM. This equals 40 and 73 percent of the initial prison and EM sample, respectively.  
 
This analytic sample is described in Appendix B, and reassuringly, this description suggests that our 
sampling procedure has been successful in creating a treatment and comparison group that is close to 
identical on all control and moderator variables. Divergence is primarily found in the moderator 
variables, with the treatment group having a slightly lower proportion of offenders who were 
unemployed or had low income from paid work the year before starting the sentence (32 vs. 35 and 33 
vs. 35 percent, respectively), and a higher proportion of offenders who were married (16 vs. 13 
percent) and had previously been imprisoned (8 vs. 7 percent). Similarly, the change in the treatment 
group from the pre to the post period is negligible on all variables but the moderator variables, with a 
substantially higher proportion of offenders being unemployed (28.6 vs. 47.6 percent) and having 
previous prison records (6.4 and 12.7 percent) in the post period. We see it as likely that most of these 
differences are driven by annual trends in e.g. labor market conditions that will be netted out by the 
time controls.  
6 Results 
Our results are presented in three main subsections; one for descriptive patterns, one for naïve 
regressions, and one subsection for the effect estimates relying on the quasi-experimental methods. 41 
Sensitivity analyses and robustness checks are then performed in a fourth subsection. 
                                                     
40 A translation of all guidelines (which currently are available only in Norwegian) and our operationalizations (or the lack 
thereof) are summarized in Table 9 in Appendix A. 
41 Note that we, due to a large number of dummy variables (e.g. 142 for time (year, month and year*month)) and a high 
number of models (3 outcomes*3 follow-up lengths for each model) have chosen not to include esimates for the control 
variables in the manuscript. These are available from the authors upon request.  
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6.1 Descriptive patterns 
In order to have a point of reference when interpreting the effect estimates, we summarize the mean 
values of all recidivism outcomes in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, recidivism measures. Main analytic sample (N=24 329) 
 Recidivism rate Recidivism intensitya Recidivism severity 
 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Min/max 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/6 1/9 1/11 10/201 10/201 10/201 
Mean 0.1509 0.2428 0.3227 2.10 2.59 2.98 61.66 63.27 64.09 
S. D. 0.3079 0.4290 0.4675 1.50 2.20 2.75 27.01 27.71 27.90 
N 24329 24224 22034 3671 5895 7280 3671 5895 7280 
a: Before winsorization the maximum value was 299, and the mean was 2.42, 2.94, and 3.42 after 1, 2 and 3 
years, respectively. 
 
As we can see, the recidivism rate for our study sample ranges from 15 percent after one year to 32 
percent after 3 years. These numbers are substantially lower than what has previously been found for 
Norwegian releasees (Andersen and Skardhamar, 2015), reflecting the low-risk character of this 
sample. Out of all the offenders who committed a new offence during the follow up, the mean number 
of reoffences ranges from 2 new offences after one year to nearly 3 offences after 3 years. The severity 
measure holds no direct interpretation, but we see that the overall trend is that of increased severity as 
we expand the follow-up period. There are some variations between the treatment and the comparison 
group in their reoffending behavior, with the recidivism rates being slightly higher and the recidivism 
severity slightly lower in the treatment counties (see Table 11 in Appendix B).  
 
To explore one of the key underlying assumptions of our analytical strategy, namely that trends in 
recidivism are (and would have continued to be) similar in the treatment and comparison counties in 
the absence of EM, we move on to estimating recidivism in the two groups around the time of 
implementation. In an ideal scenario we would observe smooth and consistent annual recidivism 
trends that changed (or did not change) around the time of implementation. However, the recidivism 
trends in our data (see Appendix C) are quite “noisy” – especially when broken down into shorter time 
periods (results not shown). In the following we therefore account for some (but admittedly not all)  of 
this noise by assessing recidivism trends on a relative (not calendar) time scale, aggregating rates by 
year, and controlling for  time trends (calendar year and month of starting the sentence) as well as the 
sex and age composition  of the sample. 
 
In creating the relative time scale we separate between the three changes occurring in the EM program 
between 2008 and 2011: The implementation in six counties in the fall of 2008, the expansion in 
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capacity in two counties in 2010, and the implementation on four more counties in 2011.42 We then 
estimate recidivism outcomes as measured after 1-3 years for everyone who started their sentence up 
to 7 years before and 3 years after the implementation in a given county (i.e. for as long as our data 
allow), combining records and presenting average43 trends. This structure implies that some records in 
the original data contribute to more than one implementation/change; for instance, those who start 
their sentence on Feb 1 2009 will be in year 1 for the 2008 implementation, -1 for the 2010 extension 
and -3 for the 2011 implementation. The N is therefore larger here than is our main analyses. It is 
worth noticing that the estimates for period +3 must be interpreted with some caution, as data 
limitations entail that these are solely driven by those starting their sentence 3 years after the 2008 
implementation. Please see Table 13 in Appendix C for an overview of how the different 
implementations contribute to this analysis.  
 
Due to space limitations the nine figures of recidivism trends are included in Appendix C.  As we see 
from these figures, there seem – despite the fairly noisy pre-implementation trends – to be a drop in 
the recidivism rates in the EM counties after the implementation that exceeds those of the comparison 
counties. However, the intensity and severity measures show an increase in the treatment group from 
the year before to the year after the implementation that exceeds that in the comparison group, before 
the estimates drop in the second and third year after the implementation. In sum, the descriptive 
figures suggest that there was a decline in recidivism rates in the EM counties after EM was 
introduced, while the patterns for recidivism intensity and severity are more mixed. The trends are not 
as clear as we would prefer, which makes it harder to make certain conclusions based on mere visual 
presentations. Nonetheless, these figures all suggest that any effect of EM on recidivism is likely 
driven by changes in averages over time rather than sharp changes from one year to another.  
6.2 Naïve regressions  
To empirically examine the relationship between (actually) serving on EM and reoffending, we 
perform a regular OLS regression for each outcome variable and control for important observable 
characteristics. We use a dichotomous (EM) variable representing those who actually served on EM 
(N= 1857). The EM estimates are summarized in Table 4 below.  
 
  
                                                     
42 As the implementation/expansion dates vary somewhat between treatment counties on both 2008 and 2011, we set the 
“implementation date” (i.e. time 0) in the comparison counties to the most frequent date in the treatment counties: September 
22 2008, January 1 2010 and October 1 2011.  
43 The time trends vary somewhat for the three changes (results not shown), but the overall picture is similar.  
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Table 4: Estimates from naïve regression of recidivism on actually serving on EM or 
not. Simple and extended models. Main analytic sample (N=24 329) 
 Simple model Extended model N 
 b SE b SE  
Rate      
1 year -0.0526* 0.0086 -0.0488* 0.0095 24 329 
2 years -0.0805* 0.0104 -0.0606* 0.0113 24 224 
3 years -0.0918* 0.0138 -0.0655* 0.0148 22 034 
Intensity      
1 year -0.1790 0.1117 -0.0852 0.1191 3671 
2 years -0.2686* 0.1287 -0.1333 0.1357 5895 
3 years -0.4992* 0.1465 -0.2194 0.1538 7280 
Severity      
1 year -2.2022 2.0123 -0.2432 2.1517 3671 
2 years -4.1396* 1.6212 -2.1619 1.7331 5895 
3 years -3.8331* 1.4881 -0.6634 1.5901 7280 
Note: Each line and column represents results from one regression. 
Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all extended models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year.  
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
From the raw differences between the EM and prison sample (represented by the estimates in the 
simple models) we can clearly see that those on EM have lower recidivism rates than those who serve 
their sentence in prison, and that those who reoffend do so less frequently and less severely.44 This 
corresponds to the finding in Rokkan (2012b) and Rasmussen et al. (2016).  Moving on to the 
extended models, however, we see that these differences are reduced when accounting for some of the 
individual characteristics of those on EM and those in prison. And while the differences in recidivism 
rates remain statistically significant, the differences in recidivism intensity and severity do not. The 
results hence suggest that some (and for certain measures, maybe all) of the observed difference in 
reoffending behavior among those on EM and those in prison is driven by selection rather than 
causation. 
6.3 Effect estimates  
We now move on to our quasi-experimental models trying to capture the causal effect of EM on 
recidivism. Effect estimates from both the DD and IV analyses are shown in Table 5 below. 
Specification tests and robustness results are provided in Section 6.4, and the F-tests from the first 
stage of the IV model are summarized in table 14 in Appendix D. 
  
                                                     
44 If we use an unrestricted sample of everyone on EM vs. everyone serving an unconditional prison sentence of 120 days or 
less in prison, the differences are even more substantial. For instance, the relative difference in the 2-year recidivism rate is 
46.8 percent, while it (as seen in table 4) is 32.4 percent in our current sample. 
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Table 5: Effect of EM introduction on reoffending behavior, 1-3 years after release. Simple and 
extended models. Main analytic sample (N=24 329) 
 1 year 2 years 3 years 
 Simple Extended Simple Extended Simple Extended 
 b SE b SE b SE B SE b SE b SE 
Rate             
DD -.0135 .0108 -.0164 .0107 -.0194 .0113 -.0238* .0112 -.0005 .0144 -.0048 .0140 
IV -.0291 .0162 -.0348* .0162 -.0380* .0185 -.0461* .0184 -.0060 .0248 -.0144 .0240 
Intensity             
DD -.0242 .1110 -.0604 .1125 .0774 .1282 .0473 .1290 .0261 .1440 -.0238 .1444 
IV .1316 .2835 .0550 .2933 .3461 .2777 .2967 .2903 .2233 .2844 .1435 .3003 
Severity             
DD 1.2696 1.5562 1.339 1.674 .9240 1.474 .5720 1.549 1.3190 1.290 .7780 1.340 
IV 2.7318 3.5874 3.0514 3.8708 2.0636 2.7848 1.1661 2.8929 2.6037 2.3953 1.5224 2.5135 
N 24 329 24 329 24 224 24 224 22 034 22 034 
Note: Each line and column represents results from one regression. 
Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all extended models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year.  
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
As we see from the table, there are no statistically significant estimates of the effect of EM on neither 
recidivism intensity nor severity, irrespective of which estimator we use. This hence confirms our 
expectations from the naïve regressions. For the rate measures, however, both the DD and IV models 
consistently estimate that EM led to a statistically significant decline in the 2-year recidivism rates. 
The ITT effect, which is expressed in the DD-estimate of -2.38 percentage points, equals a 9.8 percent 
decline in the 2-year recidivism rates in the treatment counties after EM was implemented. Moreover, 
the LATE, which is given by the IV estimates of 3.48 and 4.61 percentage points after one and two 
years respectively, equals a relative decline of 23.1 and 19.0 percent among those who actually served 
on EM. If we calculate the LATE from a model where the first stage is based on the DD estimate, i.e. 
if we effectively attribute the overall DD estimate solely to those who actually serve on EM (assuming 
no effect on those actually serving in prison), we get a relative decline of 17.8 percent after 1 year and 
16.1 after 2 years.  
 
It is worth highlighting that the effect of EM on recidivism does not seem to last into the third year in 
neither model. It is important to remember that only those who lived in the counties that implemented 
EM in 2008 contribute to this estimate, and that the gradual increase in initiated EM sanction after the 
implementation (as seen in Figure 1) suggests that we would see effects for those who started their 
sentence in 2009 at the earliest. We can therefore not know whether this result would be replicated 
also for later cohorts, but we encourage future analyses to explore this further. If such a tempo effect is 
present, this would be of particular policy concern as it suggests that EM only have short term effects 
on recidivism while long-term outcomes remain the same.  
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6.3.1 Subsample analyses 
To explore the theoretical expectations discussed in Section 2, we split our main analytic sample into 
theoretically interesting subgroups that enable us order to better understand which mechanism(s) that 
are likely to drive these results. We will present only the results related to the 2-year recidivism rates, 
as there are no statistically significant effects in the subsamples for the other measures. All estimates 
(from models including covariates) are summarized in Table 6 below.   
 
Table 6: Effect estimates, 2-year recidivism rates. By subsample. Extended models. N=24 224 
 DD IV N 
 b SE b SE  
Age      
25 or younger -0.0227 0.0224 -0.0421 0.0365 7443 
Over 25 -0.0210 0.0129 -0.0447 0.0234 16781 
      
50 or younger -0.0195 0.0126 -0.0356 0.0204 20671 
Over 50 -0.0441 0.0236 -0.1020* 0.0465 3553 
Social integration      
Unemployeda -0.0118 0.0198 -0.0338 0.0327 8075 
Not unemployed -0.0324* 0.0119 -0.0547* 0.0201 16149 
      
Low income -0.0170 0.0215 -0.0379 0.0476 8070 
Not low income -0.0223 0.0140 -0.0411* 0.0200 16154 
      
Married -0.0111 0.0285 0.0208 0.0426 3586 
Unmarried -0.0239 0.0121 -0.0476* -0.0273 20638 
Prison experience      
Previously imprisoned -0.0090 0.0481 -0.1188 0.1189 1740 
Not previously imprisoned -0.0243* 0.0109 -0.0402* 0.0176 22484 
Note: Each line and column represents results from one regression. 
Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year.  
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
As we see from Table 6 there are indeed some heterogeneous patterns between various subgroups in 
our sample. All estimates are negative, but in most cases they only reach statistical significance for 
one subgroup. Both the DD and IV estimates are statistically significant for offenders without previous 
imprisonments and offenders without registered unemployment the year before starting the sentence, 
as is the IV estimate (but not the DD estimate) for offenders over 50, married offenders and offenders 
without low income from paid work. When we run these models on the full sample using interaction 
terms (results not shown) these estimated differences are, however, not statistically significant. It is 
also worth noticing that the statistically significant estimates typically can be found in the largest 
subsample group, and the lack of statistical significance in (and between) some groups can hence be a 
matter of statistical power. We encourage these subsample differences to be explored further in future 
analyses. 
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6.4 Specification tests and sensitivity analyses 
Before we move on to a discussion for our results we wish to address whether they are likely to be 
robust to our methodological choices and/or violations of the identifying assumptions of our models. 
We again focus on the two-year recidivism rates, as these are ones reaching statistical significance.  
 
Table 7: Sensitivity tests, 2-year recidivism rate. Extended models. Main analytic sample  
(N=24 329) 
 DD IV N 
 b SE b SE  
Baseline -0.0238* 0.0112 -0.0440* 0.0180 24 224 
Sample criteria      
120 days or less -0.0213* 0.0097 -0.0465 0.0281 48  636 
60 days or less -0.0258* 0.0098 -0.0548* 0.0246 41 480 
Current offence -0.0323* 0.0120 -0.0566* 0.0216 28 392 
Previous offending -0.0238* 0.0112 -0.0440* 0.0180 24 224 
Clustering of S.E.      
County -0.0238* 0.0099 -0.0440* 0.0153 24 224 
Personal Identification Number -0.0238* 0.0121 -0.0440* 0.0208 24 224 
Timing      
County year-1 -0.0265* 0.0119 -0.0528* 0.0198 24 224 
treatXyear      
2003 0.0036 0.0205   24 224 
2004 -0.0176 0.0222   24 224 
2005 0.0153 0.0246   24 224 
2006 0.0063 0.0216   24 224 
2007 -0.0263 0.0197   24 224 
2008 -0.0231 0.0221   24 224 
2009 -0.0144 0.0206   24 224 
2010 -0.0110 0.0210   24 224 
2011 -0.0254 0.0188   24 224 
Note: Each line and column represents results from one regression unless otherwise specified. 
Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year unless otherwise specified. 
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
A first concern is that our definition of the group of offenders likely to be eligible for EM (i.e. our 
sample criteria) is either important for our estimates or has compromised the external validity of our 
results. The second panel of Table 7shows the effect of EM on the 2-year recidivism rate when the 
models are run on four different samples, where we gradually apply more sample restrictions until we 
arrive at the main analytic sample. As we can see the estimates and their p-values remain almost 
unchanged irrespective of which sample criteria we use, which we find to be reassuring.  
 
Moreover, we rerun all analyses using different several kinds of clustered standard errors (see the third 
panel of table 7). We find that this does not affect the standard errors in any substantial way.  
 
A third key issue is whether the EM implementation led a certain group of offenders to move into EM 
counties in order to qualify, hereby making EM eligibility endogenous to individual characteristics 
(and potentially also recidivism risk). We address the impact of self-selection by re-running the 
analyses using a treatment-variable (treatXpost) that is based on the offender’s permanent residence 
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address as of Jan 1 the year before starting the sentence. If offenders have moved to EM counties in 
order to qualify, and the pre- and post-composition in these counties differ systematically, we would 
expect the estimates to change. As we see from the fourth panel of Table 7 the estimates increase 
somewhat in size, but they are all well within one standard error of our main results. Examining 
moving patterns (results not shown) we also find that 94 percent of the sanctions on EM were served 
by offenders who lived in an EM county both the year of and the year before starting the sentence.  
6.4.1 Pre-implementation trends 
The main identifying assumption for the DD-approach is equal trends in recidivism in the treatment 
and comparison counties in the absence of EM. The recidivism trends in the figures in Appendix C are 
more inconsistent than we would ideally like; for instance, those who started their sentence 1-12 
months before EM was implemented or extended (i.e. during year -1) had higher recidivism rates if 
they lived in treatment counties than if they lived in comparison counties. And although the rates are 
not higher than one can observe for these counties also in previous periods, the lack of consistency in 
these trends gives reason for some concern. To examine whether there are reason to believe that the 
EM counties were selected to participate in the pilot due to their pre-implementation recidivism trends, 
we rerun equation (1) using an interaction term between treat and year instead of treatXpost. If the 
interaction terms are significant before EM is implemented, this would challenge the validity of our 
DD analysis. Reassuringly, these estimates (shown in the lower panel of Table 7) are not statistically 
different from zero for any of the pre-implementation years. This is also true for the post-
implementation years (2009-2011), and the effect we capture in our models is hence driven by the 
average negative effect of all post-implementation cohorts rather than just one year. However, if we 
run regressions on all pre-implementation years, we do not find significant negative effects. 
6.4.2 Changes in sentencing practices 
Another, more profound challenge to both our DD and IV analyses is that the introduction of EM may 
have affected reoffending behavior in other ways than the introduction and extension of EM itself. 
One key way in which this may happen is if judges changed their behavior in court because of the EM 
introduction; more lenient judges might for instance be more likely to convict someone to 120 instead 
of e.g. 130 days of prison due to the EM criteria, while the opposite could be true for judges less in 
favor of EM/non-custodial sentences. It is also possible that the introduction of EM shifted some 
offenders from other sentencing options to unconditional prison; either because the judge preferred 
some aspects of EM and saw it as improbable that the offender would not be admitted, or because 
judges favored EM’s ability to ease the pressure on the prison system.  
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To explore these possibilities further, we use the register data on all45 passed criminal sanctions 
(Statistics Norway 2016b) to assess changes in passed court convictions in the EM counties after the 
implementation of EM. We first explore a shift in the distribution of conviction length, by estimating 
the likelihood of being convicted to an unconditional prison sentence of a) 120 days or less (i.e. a 
theoretically qualifying sentence), and b) 60 days or less (i.e. a factual qualifying sentence) as 
compared to longer unconditional prison sentences. Second, we explore a change in the likelihood of 
receiving an unconditional sentence of maximum 120 or 60 days as compared to all other sanctions. 
Finally, we explore a change in the likelihood of being convicted to community service or conditional 
prison as compared to any other sentence, as these are sentence types from which we could expect to 
see a spill-over to EM (see Rokkan 2011, p. 14). Estimates are summarized in Table 8 below. 46  
 
Table 8: Changes in sentencing practices after the EM implementation. DD-estimates, 
extended models. N=204 064 
Sample Outcome variable b S.E. N 
All unconditional  Unconditional prison to <=120 days -0.0017 0.0059 91 539 
prison sentences Unconditional prison to <=60 days -0.0033 0.0071 91 539 
All passed  Unconditional prison <=120 days 0.0126* 0.0048 204 064 
convictions Unconditional prison <=60 days 0.0096* 0.0044 204 064 
 Community service/conditional prison -0.0119* 0.0058 204 064 
 Community service -0.0078 0.0042 204 064 
 Conditional prison -0.0041 0.0062 204 064 
Note: Each line represents results from one regression. 
Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year.  
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
As we see from the upper panel of the table, there is no significant change in the likelihood of being 
convicted to a shorter, qualifying unconditional prison sentence as opposed to a longer unconditional 
sentence after EM was implemented. However, looking at all court convictions (as shown in the lower 
panel), there is a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of being convicted to a qualifying 
unconditional prison sentence and a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of being 
convicted to community service and conditional prison. This suggests a shift from these other (non-
custodial) sentencing options to unconditional prison after EM was implemented,47 although the 
estimates for the two sentencing options considered here are not statistically significant when 
measured separately.48  
 
                                                     
45 Please note that we cannot make any restrictions to these data similar to those we do to the main study sample. This is because 
the assessments of EM “suitability” cf. current and previous offending etc. are made by the NCS and not by the courts.  
46 These analyses are based on a version of Equation (1) where timet and agei are based on the date of conviction (not the date 
of starting the sentence) and the conviction length is excluded from Xi. 
47 Such a shift entails that the implementation of EM may have increased general deterrence.  
48 The estimate for community service is marginally non-significant, with a p-value of 0.067. 
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The validity of these results does, of course, hinge on the same assumptions as in our main analysis. 
To explore pre-implementation trends for all outcomes we have rerun the above models using an 
interaction term between treat and year (treatXyear) instead of treatXpost, and estimates are included 
in Appendix E. Focusing on the apparent shift from non-custodial sentencing options to short 
unconditional prison sentences, these analyses show that the results in Table 8 must be interpreted 
with some caution. First, although the estimates for short unconditional sentences are statistically 
significant in the post-implementation years (2009-2011) and not the previous years, it is worth 
noticing that the estimates are positive in all pre-implementation years and that they increase in size 
over time. Second, the estimates for both non-custodial sentencing options are negative and 
statistically significant in nearly all of the pre-implementation years – although they seem to increase 
somewhat in size after the implementation. As such, it is possible that the sentencing analysis to some 
extent captures different trends in sentencing behavior between the treatment and comparison counties. 
 
If judges changed their behavior as a result of the EM implementation this has two main implications 
for our results. First, the interpretation of our findings is challenged by the question of what exactly is 
the counterfactual (to EM): While our theoretical reasoning is based on an assumption that the 
counterfactual is a prison sentence served in prison, this analysis suggests that the counterfactual for 
some offenders can be another non-custodial sanction – for which EM would likely imply a higher 
level of control and rehabilitative content. Since we would not know the counterfactual in each case, it 
is difficult to explore this further empirically, but it is useful to keep in mind that our theoretical 
expectations may not hold for some offenders in our sample if introduction of EM actually transferred 
them from a sentence to e.g. social work to a possibly more intrusive sentence on EM.   
 
Second, the validity of our results may be compromised if a change in sentencing practices 
systematically alters the composition of our treatment group. The direction of a bias would, of course, 
depend on what type(s) of offenders are convicted differently because of EM, and whether they differ 
from others in the target group. While it is intuitive to assume that those convicted to non-custodial 
sentences have lower recidivism risks than those who are not, and that the estimated change in 
sentencing practices hence biases our results downwards, it is important to keep in mind that our main 
analytic sample comprises a low-risk subgroup of those convicted to unconditional prison. At the same 
time, the implementation is likely to affect the sentencing of offenders that are perceived to be “on the 
margin” of custodial and non-custodial sentencing options, by shifting some of those in the high-risk 
spectrum of the non-custodial groups into the low-risk spectrum of the custodial (i.e. EM) group 
(Andersen and Andersen, 2014). 
 
Using the NCS data of all sentence records (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2008) to look at the 
recidivism rates of offenders released from various sentencing types, we find that those released from 
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a community or conditional prison sentence reoffend to a higher extent than the offenders in our main 
study sample (but lower extent than everyone released from unconditional prison). Compared to our 
sample, and accounting for differences in age and gender, the 2-year recidivism rate is 14.0 percentage 
points higher among those convicted to unconditional prison and 18.7 percentage points higher among 
those convicted to community service.49 It hence seems that the change in sentencing practices 
following the EM implementation would move individuals with higher rather than lower recidivism 
rates into our sample, thus biasing our estimates upwards rather than downwards. This implies that we 
could be underestimating the effect of EM on recidivism 
7 Discussion 
This analysis set out to estimate the causal effect of EM on recidivism, placing itself within a wider 
literature on the effectiveness of custodial vs. non-custodial sentences and of EM programs more 
specifically. To answer this question we made use of the plausibly exogenous variation in EM 
eligibility that resulted from the introduction of a Norwegian EM program in 2008. The program was 
not net-widening, and did include a large focus on rehabilitative and integrating activities that were 
performed in the community instead of in prison.  
 
Our results consistently show that EM reduced 2-year recidivism rates by about 10 percent in the 
treated sample (ITT) and 19 percent among those on EM (LATE). This coincides with the overall 
literature on non-custodial vs. custodial sentences, in which most quasi-experimental studies find 
negative effects of non-custodial sanctions on recidivism (cf. Villettaz et al., 2015). Moreover, the 
study confirms the overall Scandinavian literature (Andersen and Andersen, 2014; Jørgensen, 2011; 
Larsen, 2016; Marklund and Holmberg, 2009), which points to pro-social effects of introducing EM in 
Sweden and Denmark. However, we do not find any effect on neither recidivism intensity nor severity, 
and this suggests that EM has the potential to steer people out of a criminal lifestyle but not to 
significantly change the characteristics of the reoffending behavior of those who persist.  
7.1 Theoretical Mechanisms 
In order to explore the relevance of the theoretical expectations discussed in Section 2, we reran the 
main analyses in theoretically interesting subsamples. However, as we remember from Section 6.3.1, 
there were no statistically significant differences between either group. We nonetheless believe two 
main insights should be considered from this analysis.  
                                                     
49 These numbers are based on a linear model with controls for gender (female=1) and age at release (quadratic variable), 
using data on all sentencing records (Norwegian Correctional Service, 2008) for community service, conditional prison or 
EM qualifying unconditional prison (as defined in our sample criteria) with an end date between 2002 and 2008 (N=51 375). 
This pattern of higher recidivism rates in the two non-custodial groups remains unchanged if we run the analysis using the 
data on passed criminal sanctions (Statistics Norway, 2016b). 
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First, the estimates are negative both in the full sample and in all subsamples, and we do hence not 
find any support for the deterrence, situational and strain mechanisms which all suggested increases in 
recidivism as a result of EM (cf. Jørgensen, 2011; Marklund and Sweberg, 2009; Killias et al., 2010). 
Second, and although we are unable to draw certain conclusions based on the data at hand, the main 
results seem to be driven by changes in certain groups of offenders. Combining the information on 
where we find statistically significant estimates (Table 7) and the theoretical expectations in Table 1, 
this suggests the following support for some of the mechanisms that produce negative effects of EM 
on recidivism.  
 
The estimates are negative and statistically significant among those who have never been imprisoned 
before but non-significant among those who have – suggesting support for the protection mechanism. 
The integration mechanism also receives some support in that we find statistically significant declines in 
recidivism among those who are not registered as unemployed and those who have an income exceeding 
the base rate of the of the National Insurance Scheme, but not among those without registered 
unemployment and lower income from paid work. This suggests that EM can reduce recidivism because 
it enables offenders with links to the labor market to maintain those links while serving their sentence – 
an interesting possibility we hope will be pursued in future analyses. On the other hand, the protection 
mechanism is contradicted in that the IV analyses show statistically significant declines among those 
who are unmarried rather than married. This can indicate that to serve a sentence at home is more 
challenging to the life/crime balance when in a marital relationship, as suggested by Sørensen and 
Kyvsgaard (2009), hence providing support for the situational mechanism. The estimated effect sizes are 
consistently larger for offenders over the age of 50, although only statistically significant in the IV 
models. This suggests that EM might serve as a “hook for change” for these offenders cf. the hook for 
change mechanism. It is worth noticing that we do not find any particularly beneficial effects among 
young offenders, as was the case in Jørgensen (2011) and Andersen and Andersen (2015). While 
seemingly unique in the Scandinavian context, this is more in line with the international literature which 
suggests small or zero effects of programs and treatment on young offenders (e.g. Uggen and Staff, 
2001). In sum, and although associated with statistical uncertainty, our subsample analysis may be taken 
to suggest that policies which are able to keep offenders without previous imprisonments out of prison 
and/or enable offenders with existing employment relations to maintain these while serving their 
sentence50 is worthy of further policy attention. 
                                                     
50 Consistent with similar mechanisms, Bhuller et al. (2016) find that imprisonment reduces residivism significantly among 
individuals who were not working prior to incarceration, while there is no effect on individuals who were working. 
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7.2 Study limitations 
There remains some concern as to whether the identifying assumptions of our models are met. The 
pre-implementation trends are not as consistent as one would like, and there could still be features of 
the EM implementation that we have not become aware of or been able to capture in our data. 
Moreover, the signs that sentencing practices changed after the EM implementation still comprise a 
potential source of bias, although this may very well be biasing our effect estimates toward zero. As 
such, our analysis faces some of the methodological challenges that characterize the EM and non-
custodial literature more generally (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013; Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 
2005; Whitfield, 2001). We do, however, find it reassuring that neither of the sensitivity analyses or 
robustness checks have compromised our results, suggesting that the results do not hinge on particular 
choices in setting up the samples or models. 
 
There are several other limitations to our analysis that we wish to highlight. First, it is important to 
remember that our outcome measures are based on administrative registers that only include 
information on (the unknown proportion of) offences that are discovered, reported, investigated and 
solved by the police. The offences that are not included in our data will, however, only bias our effect 
estimates as long as these “dark numbers” are unevenly distributed between our treatment and 
comparison groups. One way to deal with this shortcoming is to supplement the registers with self-
reported offending, but such data are not available. 
 
Second, and as regards to the external validity of our results, we are not able to distinguish between 
the effects of the RF technology and the other component of the Norwegian EM program – to do this 
we would need more variation in both the technologies used and other services provided. It is hence 
challenging to determine whether we could expect to see similar effects if one was to implement the 
same program in another penal (and social, economic and cultural) setting. Renzema and Mayo-
Wilson’s (2010, p. 219) review states that EM reduces recidivism primarily when implemented in 
systems that are characterized by an overall focus on treatment and rehabilitation, and as this is the 
case for the Norwegian system we believe the external validity of our findings is highest for other 
systems with similar characteristics. 
 
Third, we are not able to determine whether the lack of a statistically significant decline in 3-year 
recidivism rates is due to a tempo-effect of EM on recidivism in the full sample, the presence of such 
an effect in the counties enrolled in the 2008 pilot, or simply a lack of statistical power associated with 
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the lower number of observations. We would encourage a replication of the analysis using later 
cohorts than 2011, in order to determine whether this is the case.51  
 
Fourth and finally, our subsample analysis is only able to provide limited insight into which 
mechanisms that can be relevant – while the “black box” between EM and recidivism is yet to be 
opened and dissected (Hedström, 2005). We encourage future studies to investigate these (and other) 
mechanisms further, as a greater understanding of their explanatory powers would enhance our 
knowledge on why EM programs (and non-custodial sentences more generally) can or cannot make a 
substantial difference to the lives of offenders. 
7.3 Policy implications 
This analysis suggests that non-custodial alternatives to prison, here represented by an EM program, 
can have favorable effects on recidivism. This is encouraging in several respects, as it supports the 
idea that non-custodial alternatives to prison can be beneficial to the system, the public and the 
offender alike.52 Such a win-win scenario encourages the search of other non-custodial sentencing 
options, and our subsample analyses suggest that non-custodial options that enable the offender to 
maintain employment relations can be particularly worth exploring. Moreover, a potential next step 
could be to expand the target group of the current program to include other groups of offenders, as has 
been done in e.g. Denmark. 
 
To this positive conclusion we have three main objections. First, an important, yet unexplored issue is 
whether and how implementing EM (or other non-custodial sanctions) has unintended consequences 
for offenders who are not in the program’s target group, here being those who serve longer sentences 
in prison. EM can – by removing the “straightest” offenders from prison – make prison conditions 
harsher or less rehabilitative for those who remain, and this can in turn affect individual outcomes as 
well as overall crime rates. We do not suggest that one should keep offenders who would recidivate to 
a lesser (or equal) extent after a non-custodial sentence in prison in order to “make prison nicer” for 
everyone, merely that this is an area worthy of both scientific scrutiny, policy attention, and if better 
documentation evolves, compensatory efforts. 
 
Second, if later studies confirm a tempo effect of diminishing effects of EM over time, this would be 
of particular policy concern. If serving on EM simply serves to “set offenders off on a good note”, 
                                                     
51 Most studies typically apply a follow-up of no more than two years, and that in a two-year follow-up our conclusion would 
be unambiguous. 
52 Note that even a restrictive interpretation of our findings, in which the negative effect estimates could be discarded due to 
the remaining methodological challenges, we find no support to claims that EM increases recidivism. Due to positive 
experiences made by offenders and correctional officers alike, as well as desireable impacts on prison capacity and 
correctional spending (Rasmussen et al., 2016), an overall positive conclusion would persist.   
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while the long-term outcomes remain unchanged, this would call for increased attention to what 
measures can be taken in order to maintain lower recidivism over time.  
 
Third, implementing EM can have a negative impact on general deterrence. It is important to keep in 
mind that the implementation of (seemingly) less punitive sentencing options can increase crime rates 
in general, hence posing a potential threat to public safety.  
 
Finally, and on a more general note, a useful policy insight comes from the obvious challenges in 
deriving causal effects of this EM program. It is an outspoken policy goal both in Norway and 
elsewhere to determine “what works” in criminal justice, and in order to do so we would strongly 
encourage a closer connection between the implementation and evaluation stages of a given program. 
This would enable all research designs – from the highest53 to the lowest level of scientific 
rigorousness (Sherman et al., 1997) – to be considered from the get-go, hereby improving the 
prospects of achieving as high an internal validity as ethically and practically feasible.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This study uses plausible exogenous variation in EM eligibility to estimate causal effects of EM on 
recidivism. Using a pilot in Norway as the framework for a difference-in-differences and instrumental 
variables design, the results indicate that implementing EM reduced 2-year recidivism rates by about 
10 percent in the counties that took part in the implementation,  translating into a reduction of about 19 
percent for those who served their sentence on EM. However, we find no effects on recidivism 
intensity nor severity, suggesting that EM has the potential to steer (some) people out of a criminal 
lifestyle but not to significantly change the characteristics of the reoffending behavior of those who 
persist. The results are somewhat challenged by inconsistent pre-implementation trends in recidivism, 
and by analyses which suggest that judges have increased their use of EM qualifying sentences after 
EM was implemented. Subsample analyses, although statistically imprecise, show that the effects are 
strongest among offenders without recent unemployment spells and/or without previous 
imprisonments. This may be taken to suggest that policies which keep offenders out of prison and/or 
enable offenders with existing employment relations to maintain these while serving their sentence, 
are worthy of further attention. In sum, this study adds to a growing body of literature that suggests 
that it is possible to reduce prison populations and correctional spendings without making 
compromises on behalf of recidivism or other criminal justice goals; a finding that is promising in both 
the Norwegian and international setting. 
  
                                                     
53 This promotes randomized experiments as the “gold standard” for causal inference; see e.g. Berk (2005) and Sampson 
(2010) for alternative views. 
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Appendix A: Sampling procedure 
Table 9: EM criteria and operationalizations 
Official stating of guidelines § Operationalization of official 
guidelines 
Final operationalization 
CURRENT OFFENCE    
Unconditional prison sentence of max. 4 
months  
If numerous sentences: total length max. 4 
months  
7-2 Max 120 unconditional days in 
sentence identifier 
Max 60 unconditional days 
in sentence identifier  
Not convicted to preventive detention or fine 
atonement 
7-2 Only convictions to prison 
included 
 
Exceptions from all rules for offenders under 
the age of 18 at the time of application 
7-2 Age 17 or younger at time of 
starting the sentence included 
Age 17 or younger at time 
of starting the sentence 
excluded 
No risk of evasion 7-3 Not available in data  
“General rule”:     
No sexual offences 
    Exceptions can be made for offenders 
under the age of 23. 
7-3 Sexual=0.  
Exceptions ignored 
 
No violent offences 
    Exceptions can be made if the sentence is 
less than 60 days 
7-3 Violent=0. 
Exceptions ignored 
 
No offences committed from the 
home/against family members  
    Exceptions can be made for offenders 
under the age of 23. 
7-3 Not available in data  
Exceptions ignored 
 
Not convicted due to violation of conditions 
for other sanctions 
7-2 Not available in data  
“Should be taken into consideration”:    
Type of offence 7-3 See own crime type criterion  
Young age 7-3 See own age criterion  
Severity of offence 7-3 Insufficient information in 
guidelines 
 
Time since offence 7-3 Insufficient information in 
guidelines 
 
Common conceptions of justice 7-3 Not available in data   
Interests of victims and their relatives 7-3 Not available in data   
Need for societal protection 7-3 Not available in data   
Health issues 7-3 Not available in data  
Behavior during preparatory proceedings 7-3 Not available in data   
PREVIOUS OFFENDING    
Previous sanctions for offenses that would 
disqualify for EM should be “taken into 
consideration” 
7-3 Previous violent=0 
Previous sexual=0 
 
“General rule”: No charges for new crimes cf. 
the Criminal Procedure Act § 82  
7-2 Recent charges=0  
“Should/can be emphasized”: 
Previous offences committed while serving a 
sentence 
 
7-3 
 
During atonement=0 
 
A history of technical violations 7-3 Not available in data   
A history of “no-show” 7-3 Not available in data   
LIVING CONDITIONS    
Permanent work- or residence permit 7-2 Norwegian PIN required  
Suitable place of residence in EM county 7-2 
7-3 
County=an EM county 
Suitability requirement ignored 
 
Employment or other suitable activity during 
atonement 
7-4 Ignored  
Written consent of any household members 
over the age of 18 
7-3 Not available in data   
Not compromising the best interests of 
children 
7-3 Not available in data   
“Rule of thumb”: Not deported from the country 7-1 Not available in data   
All paragraphs in the table refer to Norwegian Correctional Service (2013). All operationalizations refer to 
variables defined in Section 5.2. 
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Table 9 includes information on all absolute and more discretionary guidelines for admitting offenders 
to EM. The leftmost column denotes the guidelines as stated in the official document (own 
translations, with discretionary language in quotation marks to improve transparency), separated into 
three sections depending on whether they relate to the current offence, previous offending or to the 
living conditions of the offender. The middle column denotes our operationalizations, including 
information on which guidelines we don’t have information on and which are defined too vaguely to 
be properly assessed. The rightmost column denotes the final operationalization of a given guideline 
(if different from the initial). 
 
A few notes on the transition from the middle to the rightmost column in Table 9 are in order. Firstly, 
the official guideline set the cutoff of sentence length to 120 days, while we set it to 60 days in our 
final analysis. This is due to the practical execution of the guidelines, which shows that only 3 percent 
of the offenders on EM have a sentence length of more than 60 days.54 Secondly, and based on the 
same logic, the guidelines enable all rules on sentence length, type of offence, previous offending etc. 
to be disregarded in cases where the offender is under 18 years old at the time of application. 
However, no offenders in the actual EM group are this young, and offenders under the age of 18 are 
therefore excluded rather than included. Thirdly, all violent offences – both current and previous ones 
– are excluded, even though some offenders convicted of common and aggravated assaults have been 
permitted to serve on EM and these offenders have been described elsewhere as “in the target group” 
of EM (see Rokkan 2012a). The occurrence of assaults is, however, substantially more common in the 
prison sample, and we therefore prefer the stricter criterion.55 Fourth, some of the guidelines are 
deliberately not used for sample criteria although we do have some vaguely related information in the 
data. We ignore the employment/activity criterion as all offenders were to receive ample assistance in 
finding “suitable work”, meaning that it is very unlikely that anyone would fail to meet EM eligibility 
because of this. Moreover, the exceptions that can be made to some criteria are also ignored because 
they seem to have been very rarely used in practice. Fifth and finally, issues of health, individual 
behavior and sense of justice cannot be assessed in our data.  
 
Table 10 shows the occurrence of the various sample criteria in the prison and EM samples, which we 
have presented in two ways. First, in the middle (“Iterating”) column, we have summarized simple 
cross tabulations showing the proportion of offenders in the prison and EM samples that fall within a 
given sample criterion (listed in the left-most column). For instance, we see that 97 percent of the EM 
sample is convicted to no more than 60 days of unconditional prison, while the same is true for 70 
                                                     
54 It is worth noticing that other sample criteria make the difference between a 60 and 120 cutoff almost negligible (1857 vs. 
1908 EM records (a 2.7% increase) and 22 427 vs. 23 909 prison records (a 6.6% increase), respectively). 
55 After all other simple criteria are imposed, only 99 EM sentences and 2301 prison sentences (a 5 and 9 percent difference, 
respectively) distinguish a sample where these particular kinds of violent offences are included or excluded. 
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percent of the prison sample. Second, in the right-most (“Stepwise”) column we show the proportion 
of the original EM and prison samples that remain after a given sample criterion and those in previous 
rows in the table have been imposed. For instance, about 60 percent of the original prison sample 
(N=56 246) and 90 percent of the original EM sample (N=2 448) remain after offenders that are 
convicted to more than 60 days of unconditional prison and who are convicted of sexual and/or violent 
offences are excluded. The bottom row of the right-most column shows that after all sample criteria 
have been applied we are left with about 40 and 76 percent of these two samples.  
 
Table 10: The occurrence of the sample criteria in the EM and prison samples. Percentages 
Criterion Iterating Stepwise 
 Prison EM EM Prison 
Sentence length: Max 120 82.53 99.89 82.53 99.89 
Sentence length: Max 60 69.85 97.06 69.85 97.06 
Current offence: Sex 2.76 0.37 69.24 96.69 
Current offence: Violence 17.89 6.62 59.65 90.16 
Previously convicted: Sex 1.28 0.53 59.65 90.16 
Previously convicted: Violence 16.11 6.33 52.97 84.23 
Under 18 years when starting sentence 0.09 0 52.94 84.23 
New charges 27.1 7.27 42.86 78.80 
Previous offending during atonement 12.09 3.64 41.44 77.25 
Released from prison within 24 months of current sentence 13.22 2.49 39.95 75.86 
N 56 246 2 448 56 246 2 448 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of main analytic sample, treatment and comparison group.  
Percentages and means (with standard deviations). N=24 329 
  Comparison Treatment 
OUTCOME VARIABLES    
Recidivism rate 1 year 14.61 % 15.44 % 
 2 years 23.84 % 24.61 % 
 3 years 30.52 % 30.73 % 
Recidivism intensity 1 year  2.15 (1.53)  2.07 (1.47) 
 2 years  2.61 (2.24)  2.57 (2.17) 
 3 years  2.97 (2.76)  2.98 (2.74) 
Recidivism severity 1 year 63.03 (27.83) 60.71 (26.39) 
 2 years 64.21 (28.53) 62.61 (27.09) 
 3 years 64.53 (28.38) 63.77 (28.54) 
ANALYTICAL VARIABLES   
EM (actual)  0.55 % 12.84 % 
Capacity  0.00 5.31 (0.09) 
Year of starting sentence            2002 10.71 %  9.57 % 
 2003  9.30 %  9.58 % 
 2004  9.67 % 10.10 % 
 2005 10.19 % 10.80 % 
 2006 10.75 %  9.71 % 
 2007 10.98 % 10.63 % 
 2008 10.58 % 10.21 % 
 2009  9.31 %  9.63 % 
 2010  9.51 % 10.87 % 
 2011  9.01 %  8.90 % 
County of residence Agder 0.00 % 10.41 % 
 Akershus 0.00 % 16.63 % 
 Hedmark 0.00 % 7.53 % 
 Hordaland 0.00 % 13.66 % 
 Oslo 0.00 % 17.78 % 
 Rogaland 0.00 % 13.20 % 
 Sogn og Fjordane 0.00 % 3.12 % 
 Troms 0.00 % 8.16 % 
 Vestfold 0.00 % 9.51 % 
 Other 100.00 % 0.00 % 
treatXpost  0.00 % 20.60 % 
CONTROL VARIABLES   
Sex                   Male 88.5 % 88.26 % 
Age at starting sentence  34.82 (12.09) 35.48 (12.83) 
Age at first offence  28.81 (13.12) 29.08 (12.97) 
Conviction length (days)  25.69 (10.32) 25.84 (10.50) 
MODERATOR VARIABLES   
Age at starting sentence 25 or younger 32.69 % 29.20 % 
Age at starting sentence 55 or older 14.78 % 14.63 % 
Unemployed at least one month the year before starting the sentence 34.81 % 32.40 % 
Low income from paid work  34.52 % 32.48 % 
Union status Married 13.24 % 16.00 % 
Previously imprisoned  6.60 % 7.71 % 
N  10 314 14 015 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics of treatment group, pre and post EM implementation. Percent-
ages and means (with standard deviations). N=14 015 
Post=0 Post=1 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
Recidivism rate 1 year 15.57 % 14.93 % 
2 years 25.14 % 22.50 % 
3 years 31.01 % 29.11 % 
Recidivism intensity 1 year 2.08 (1.48) 2.01 (1.45) 
2 years 2.95 (2.17) 2.93 (2.18) 
3 years 3.69 (3.02) 3.37 (2.54) 
Recidivism severity 1 year 60.71 (26.49) 60.71 (26.01) 
2 years 64.49 (27.25) 63.56 26.41) 
3 years 67.11 (27.69) 65.29 (26.79) 
ANALYTICAL VARIABLES 
EM (actual) 0.37 % 60.93 % 
Capacity 0.00 (0.00) 25.79 (5.96) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Sex     Male 88.76 % 86.35 % 
Age at starting sentence 35.22 (12.77) 36.39 (13.01) 
Age at first offence 29.17 (12.99) 28.74 (12.87) 
Conviction length (days) 25.93 (10.26) 26.57 (11.36) 
MODERATOR VARIABLES 
Age at starting sentence 25 or younger 26.64 % 23.14 % 
Age at starting sentence 55 or older 8.40 % 9.01 % 
Unemployed at least one month the year before starting the sentence 28.58 % 47.35 % 
Low income from paid work 32.05 % 34.15 % 
Union status Married 15.48 % 17.98 % 
Previously imprisoned 6.43 % 12.68 % 
N 11 128 2 887 
52 
Appendix C: Recidivism trends 
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Note that the x-axis in the nine figures above represents the number of years since implementation – 
not the outcome as measured after a given number of years, and that the vertical line at year 0 in all 
plots hence denotes the timing of implementation. 
Table 13 denotes the relative contribution of each implementation/change to the figures. We see that 
the 2008 implementation has the largest overall contribution to the analyses (42 percent as compared 
to 31 and 27 percent for the 2010 extension and 2011 implementation, respectively), and that there are 
fewer offenders that start their sentence in the earlier years. It is particularly worth noticing that there 
are no observations in the 2010 extension that are followed for three years, and no observations in the 
2011 implementation that are followed for two (or three) years. This is due to the data limitations of 
this particular analysis, and future analysis using richer data for these (and later) cohorts are 
encouraged.  
Table 13: Relative distribution of implementation stages 
Years since 
implementation 
2008 
implementation 
2010 
extension 
2011 
implementation 
Total 
-7 7.53 % 11.12 % 13.37 % 9.93 % 
-6 9.76 % 11.07 % 13.82 % 11.14 % 
-5 10.01 % 12.18 % 13.54 % 11.46 % 
-4 11.20 % 10.00 % 15.33 % 11.99 % 
-3 10.13 % 11.19 % 12.84 % 11.10 % 
-2 10.56 % 9.90 % 13.91 % 11.28 % 
-1 10.07 % 10.58 % 12.18 % 10.75 % 
1 9.91 % 13.37 % 5.02 % 9.46 % 
2 11.09 % 10.58 % - 8.06 % 
3 9.75 % - - 4.84 % 
N
Percent 
18 117 
42.09 % 
13 158 
30.57 % 
11 770 
27.34 % 
43 045 
100.00 % 
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Appendix D: IV-analysis 
Table 14: F-statistics for first stage IV-analyses. F-values and degrees of freedom. Main analytic 
sample (N=24 329) 
 Simple model Extended model 
 F D.f. F D.f. 
Rate     
1 year 305.077 199 311.497 199 
2 years 359.577 199 365.723 199 
3 years 1022.650 179 925.268 179 
Intensity  199  199 
1 year 227.164 199 224.186 199 
2 years 363.387 199 341.419 199 
3 years 334.056 199 334.974 199 
Severity  199  199 
1 year 227.164 199 224.186 199 
2 years 368.387 199 341.419 199 
3 years 334.056 199 334.974 199 
Note: Each line and column represents results from one regression. 
Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year.  
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Appendix E: Outcome trends, sentencing analysis. 
Table 15: Convictions to a qualifying EM sentence vs. all unconditional sentences. N=91 539 
  Unconditional prison <=120 days Unconditional prison <=60 days 
  b SE b SE 
treatXyear 2003 -0.0004 0.0157 0.0041 0.0202 
 2004 0.0076 0.0118 0.0117 0.0156 
 2005 -0.0122 0.0110 -0.0143 0.0153 
 2006 -0.0141 0.0106 -0.0170 0.0142 
 2007 -0.0084 0.0116 -0.0077 0.0143 
 2008 -0.00085 0.0170 -0.0065 0.0208 
 2009 0.0208 0.0106 0.0077 0.0133 
 2010 -0.0100 0.0121 -0.0146 0.0147 
 2011 0.0068 0.0145 0.0181 0.0156 
Note: Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year.  
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
Table 16: Convictions to a qualifying EM sentence vs. all other sentences. N=204 064 
  Unconditional prison <=120 days Unconditional prison <=60 days 
  b SE b SE 
treatXyear 2003 -0.0014    0.0117 0.0008 0.0116 
 2004 0.0219* 0.0108 0.0217* 0.0107 
 2005 0.0093 0.0095 0.0059 0.0100 
 2006 0.0124 0.0105 0.0084 0.0098 
 2007 0.0160 0.0110 0.0137 0.0105 
 2008 0.0118 0.0114 0.0108 0.0115 
 2009 0.0280* 0.0108 0.0204* 0.0102 
 2010 0.0336* 0.0112 0.0254* 0.0103 
 2011 0.0287* 0.0130 0.0304* 0.0116 
Note: Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year. 
* indicates p<0.05. 
 
Table 17: Convictions to community service and conditional prison vs. all other sentences. 
N=204 064 
   
Community service 
 
Conditional prison 
Community service or 
unconditional prison 
  b SE b SE b SE 
treatXyear 2003 0.0053 0.0101 -0.0123 0.0149 -0.0067 0.0141 
 2004 -0.0037 0.0092 -0.0401* 0.162 -0.0436* 0.0151 
 2005 0.0014 0.0089 -0.0464* 0.0137 -0.0448* 0.0135 
 2006 -0.0196* 0.0090 -0.0191 0.0128 -0.0386* 0.0137 
 2007 -0.0019 0.0089 -0.0167 0.0142 -0.0185 0.0140 
 2008 -0.0044 0.0094 -0.0283* 0.0135 -0.0328* 0.0143 
 2009 -0.0076 0.0097 -0.0300* 0.0150 -0.0375* 0.0149 
 2010 -0.0057 0.0096 -0.0485* 0.0158 -0.0541* 0.0154 
 2011 -0.0036 0.0119 -0.0356* 0.0148 -0.0391* 0.0135 
Note: Estimates of the control variables are not reported, but included in all models.  
Robust standard errors are clustered on county and year.  
* indicates p<0.05. 
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